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Corporate reorganisation of China’s listed companies:
winners and losers
Zinian Zhang*
ABSTRACT
This article is the ﬁrst empirical study investigating the corporate reorganisation
of Chinese domestically-listed companies. Through examining these cases, it
challenges the assertion made by most of these corporate reorganisation
plans and by Chinese state-run media reports that creditors and general
public shareholders were the major beneﬁciaries. Through an analysis of the
data generated from all forth-three such cases, this articles reveals that: First,
unsecured creditors could have, on average, received 61.37% more of their
claims if the fundamental value distribution principle, the absolute priority
norm, could have been complied with in these reorganisations; Second, if the
general-public-shareholder-protection scheme issued by the China Supreme
People’s Court could be rigorously implemented, 85.37% of the shares
relinquished by general public shareholders could have been avoided. These
two groups were not the winners. Instead, this article argues that it was local
governments and controlling shareholders who were the real winners.
Introduction
China’s listed companies are probably the most widely studied in China and
abroad, largely because of these companies’ importance in China’s
economy, the world’s second largest only after the USA at present.1 Evidently,
most existing studies focus on these companies’ corporate governance2 and
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
*Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Centre for Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia (CEBCLA), School of
Law, Singapore Management University. The author wishes to thank Professor Roman Tomasic for his
helpful comments and the anonymous referees whose valuable suggestions have immensely improved
this article. This article was presented at the Australian Corporate Law Teachers Association 2015 Annual
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1D Barboza, ‘China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy’ New York Times (16 August 2010) B1.
2E.g. see X Xu and Y Wang, ‘Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies’
(1999) 10 China Economic Review 75; D Qi, W Wu and H Zhang, ‘Shareholding Structure and Corporate
Performance of Partially Privatized Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies’ (2000) 8 Paciﬁc-
Basin Finance Journal 587; R Tomasic and N Andrews, ‘Minority Shareholder Protection in China’s Top
100 Listed Companies’ (2007) 9 Australian Journal of Asian Law 88; G Chen, M Firth, Y Xin and L Xu,
‘Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efﬁciency Gains in China’s Listed Companies’
(2008) 43 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 161; J Fan, T Wong and T Zhang, ‘Politically Con-
nected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized
Firms’ (2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 330.
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securities regulation issues.3 But one area of the research seems to remain
untouched: the corporate reorganisations of China’s listed companies,
which are conducted under China’s version of Chapter 114 enshrined in the
newly-enacted PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006).5 This
article attempts to address this gap by investigating how the Chinese pub-
licly-traded companies use the new corporate reorganisation law to
restructure.
This article brings together data on all 43 of China’s domestically-listed
company reorganisations which occurred between 1 June 2006 (the time
when the China’s new reorganisation law came into force) and 31 December
2013 (the date of the most recent cases). In general, the data relied upon here
were generated from company annual reports and general announcements,
mostly obtained from the ofﬁcial websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange, China’s only two domestic stock exchanges. In some cases,
in the absence of Stock Exchange data, materials for this study had to be
obtained from a commercial database, the China Stock Market & Accounting
Research Database (CSMAR), which has an archive collection on China’s stock
markets and the ﬁnancial statements of China’s listed companies. Further, this
article also draws upon facts derived from media reports, since most of these
cases drew huge press attention because of their impacts on investors, nation-
wide and beyond.
Through investigating the main characteristics of China’s listed company
reorganisations, this article seeks to challenge the assertion made in most
3E.g. see NC Howson, ‘Enforcement without Foundation: Insider Trading and China’s Administrative Law
Crisis’ (2012) 60 The American Journal of Comparative Law 955; RH Huang, ‘Private Enforcement of Secu-
rities Law in China: A Ten-Year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment’ (2013) 61 The American Journal of
Comparative Law 757; GJ Jiang, L Lu and D Zhu, ‘The Information Content of Analyst Recommendation
Revisions: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market’ (2014) 29 Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 1.
4Although Chapter 11 is widely quoted, some readers outside the bankruptcy law research might be con-
fused of this deﬁnition. In fact, it means Chapter 11 of the USA Bankruptcy Code 1978, which is for bank-
ruptcy reorganisations and has been borrowed by many other jurisdictions. See generally E Warren and JL
Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors (6th edn, New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2009) esp ch 8: ‘Chapter
11 Reorganization’.
5There are journal articles emerging in the past several years shedding light on China’s listed company
reorganisations. There are: E Lee, ‘The Reorganization Process Under China’s Corporate Bankruptcy
System’ (2011) 45 International Lawyer 939; Y Ren, ‘The “Control Model” in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorgan-
ization Law and Practice’ (2011) 85 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 177; Y Ren, ‘Wealth Distribution in
Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice’ (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 91.
Undoubtedly, Lee and Ren’s studies have considerably contributed to China’s corporate reorganisation
law research. But, two immediate key weaknesses can be spotted. First, their arguments and analysis
are based on incomplete data. For various reasons, only some high-proﬁle cases hitting the media’s head-
lines are collected in these articles, and a comprehensive data collection has not been carried out. Second
and more importantly, these articles attempt to understand China’s corporate reorganisation law and
practice through only examining some of China’s listed company reorganisations. The second weakness
can be very acute, since, in spite of being bound by the same statute, the corporate reorganisations of
China’s listed companies are, as previously examined by the author, operated in a quite different way
from those of non-listed, or ordinary, Chinese companies. Given that the majority of China’s corporate
reorganisation cases are for ordinary companies, their conclusions can be very contentious.
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of these company reorganisation plans as well as in many Chinese state-run
news agency reports that unsecured creditors and general public share-
holders were the main beneﬁciaries of these reorganisations. On the contrary,
this article uses the data to argue that the real winners in these cases were the
Chinese local governments and controlling shareholders. This article also
seeks to quantify the losses incurred by unsecured creditors and general
public shareholders. More importantly, this article analyses the unique charac-
ter of the Chinese political economy in which the governments at both local
and central levels tend to pursue short-term economic and political gains at
the expense of the rule of law.
This article proceeds in six sections. Section A provides a brief overview of
China’s domestic stock exchanges on which the companies discussed here are
listed; this section also seeks to cast light on how China’s stock exchange reg-
ulators monitor ﬁnancially-troubled listed companies. Section B describes
China’s new corporate reorganisation procedure, which is at the heart of
the EBL 2006 and has borrowed heavily from Chapter 11 of the USA Bank-
ruptcy Code 1978. Section C discusses the operation of China’s listed
company reorganisations, and analyses the main features of these cases.
Section D illustrates why unsecured creditors and general public shareholders
are losers and seeks to quantify these losses. Section E seeks to explain why
local governments and controlling shareholders end up being the real bene-
ﬁciaries. Finally, the ﬁnal section offers a conclusion and suggests some policy
reforms.
Section A: China’s stock exchanges and domestic listed
companies
China once had well-functioning stock exchanges before. But after the China
Communist Party took power in 1949, all stock exchanges were closed down
because of the communist ideology. In the 1980s, however, China started its
unprecedented economic reform, and one of major reforms was to rebuild its
stock exchanges.
1. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and China’s listed
companies
China’s current two stock exchanges, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges, were established in 1990 and 1991 respectively.6 In October
6See a brief history of China’s stock market in recent centuries in Z Chen, ‘Capital Freedom in China as
Viewed from the Evolution of the Stock Market’ (2013) 33 Cato Journal 587. See also an article describing
the recent development of China’s stock market: S Cheng, ‘An Analysis of China’s Stock Market in the First
10 Years’ (2009) 12 Review of Paciﬁc Basin Financial Markets and Policies 629.
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1992, a ministry-level regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission,7
was created to regulate the stock markets.8
The Chinese stock markets have developed rapidly in recent three
decades. As shown in Figure 1, the number of listed companies increased
from 14 in 1990 to 2,489 by the end of 2013,9 and, according to the
World Bank, the market value of China’s domestic listed companies
amounted to US$3.7 trillion in the year 2012, the second largest after the
USA.10
It is noteworthy that one of the Chinese government’s main objectives in
opening these two stock exchanges is to use them to ﬁnance its state
owned enterprises (SOEs).11 Therefore, not surprisingly, the majority of
listed companies in China are former SOEs.12 Though there is a lack of ofﬁcial
statistics on the exact proportion, the following ﬁgures can give a glimpse on
the weight of SOEs on China’s stock exchanges.
In 2003, for example, the available data show that 1,265 out of the
then 1,300 listed companies (97%) were SOEs.13 During the recent
decade, a growing number of private companies were allowed to be
listed, but in 2013 there were still about 80% of China’s listed companies
transformed from the old SOEs.14 And, according to a senior Chinese
national ofﬁcial in charge of SOEs,15 by the end of 2012, the state still
remained as the controlling shareholder in almost half of China’s listed
companies.16
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that China’s two domestic stock
exchanges are ﬂooded with SOEs, which may cast a shadow to the corporate
reorganisation of these companies, due to their connection with governments
at various levels.
7The China State Council, ‘Introduction of the China Securities Regulatory Commission’ <http://www.gov.
cn/banshi/2006-11/28/content_455561.htm> accessed 29 September 2014.
8See a discussion of the role of the China Securities Regulatory Commission: Y Wei, ‘The Develop-
ment of the Securities Market and Regulation in China’ (2005) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review 479, 493.
9The China Securities Regulatory Commission, Statistics as of June 2014 <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/
zjhpublic/G00306204/zqscyb/201407/t20140714_257716.htm> accessed 28 September 2014; The
World Bank, Data: Listed Domestic Companies, Total <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.
LDOM.NO> accessed 28 September 2014.
10The World Bank, Data, Market Capitalisation of Listed Companies <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
CM.MKT.LCAP.CD> accessed 29 September 2014.
11See Cheng (n 6) 631.
12ibid, 597.
13D Chen, ‘Developing a Stock Market without Institutions: The China Puzzle’ (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 151, 155.
14MP Williams and DW Taylor, ‘Corporate Propping through Related-Party Transactions’ (2013) 55 Inter-
national Journal of Law and Management 28, 30.
15S Huang, ‘Strengthen the SOEs Reforms’ (2014) 3 Qiu Shi 4.
16L Tian and S Estrin, ‘Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Always
Reduce Corporate Value?’ (2008) 36 Journal of Comparative Economics 74, 78 (discussing the state own-
ership in Chinese listed companies).
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2. Special treatment of troubled listed companies
Under the listing rules of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,17 a
listed company will be placed under Special Treatment (ST) if it reports,
among other things, losses over a consecutive two-year period, which is to
alert investors that the company may be delisted if it cannot make proﬁts
in the following ﬁscal year. Such a company is classiﬁed––and labelled––as
an ST company, but the most substantial impact is that the company’s daily
share price ﬂuctuation is limited to 5%.18
In theory, an ST company will be delisted if its ﬁnancial performance cannot
be improved as required afterwards. But as has been well documented,19 it is
very rare for the delisting to be carried out in China. In most cases, these ST
companies are brought out of trouble and will continue to ﬂoat after
shaking off the ST status.
Generally, two sources of ﬁnancing help these ST companies to survive dis-
tress. First, given that the majority of China’s listed companies have parent
SOEs,20 many ST companies are rescued by their parents who can access
cheap loans from China’s state-run banks.21 Second, Chinese governments
can also subsidise and revive troubled ST companies for political and
Figure 1. Number of listed companies in China (1991–2013). Source: World Bank.
17Ch 13 of The Shenzhen Stock Exchanges’ Rules Governing Listing of Stock on Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(1998) and Ch 13 of the Shanghai Stock Exchanges’ Rules Government the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai
Stock Exchange (1998) deal with the special treatment of listed companies: The Shanghai Stock
Exchanges, ‘Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange’ <https://biz.sse.com.
cn/sseportal/en/pages/p1075/p1075_content/en_sserule20090408.pdf> accessed 30 September 2014;
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, ‘Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen Stock Exchange’
<http://www.szse.cn/main/en/RulesandRegulations/SZSERules/GeneralRules/> accessed 30 September
2014.
18See Williams and Taylor (n 14) 30.
19See e.g. Chen (n 13) 163–4, and L Tan and J Wang, ‘Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System
for China’s Listed State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy’ (2007) 7
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 143, 155.
20Williams and Taylor (n 14) 30.
21See Y Cheung, L Ling and T Lu, ‘Tunnelling and Propping Up: An Analysis of Related Party Transactions by
Chinese Listed Companies’ (2009) 17 Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 372, 383 (ﬁnding that ST companies
are usually bailed out by their parent SOEs in China).
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economic purposes. For instance, one research reveals that between 1993 and
2003, a 10-year period, the Chinese government subsidies amounted to 14%
of the proﬁts made by all China’s listed companies as a whole.22 More strik-
ingly, a recent newspaper article reported that in 2012, one ﬁnancial year,
94% of China’s listed companies were receiving RMB107 billion of govern-
ment subsidies (approximately US$17.2 billion) in total, on average each of
them given some US$7.48 million.23
All companies discussed in this article were once ST labelled at some point.
Before 2007, some of the ST companies might have resorted to the aforemen-
tioned two means to survive, but after China’s new corporate reorganisation
law came into effect in 2007, some began to use the new law to seek a formal
corporate reorganisation solution.
Section B: China’s new corporate reorganisation law
Before 2006, China had fragmented legislations on corporate bankruptcy,
and there was no formal bankruptcy reorganisation law. In 1986, China
enacted its ﬁrst bankruptcy law, China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986
(For Trial Implementation) (the EBL 1986), which only applied for SOEs.
For non-SOE enterprises, their bankruptcy had to resort to a bankruptcy
chapter in China’s Civil Procedure Law 1996.24 In reality, both laws were
inadequately implemented, since there were a meagre number of bank-
ruptcy cases every year.25 In the absence of a vigorous bankruptcy
system, most failed enterprises in China exited the market by simply
walking away. It is equally fair to say that without a rescue-oriented bank-
ruptcy law some enterprises that only suffered from a sudden illiquidity
crisis might have missed the chance to be rehabilitated, as a result of
which the going-concern value of these companies was unnecessarily
lost.26
In 2006, as part of the effort of reforming its commercial law, China promul-
gated the rescue-friendly EBL 2006 with the aim of establishing an effective
corporate bankruptcy system and of helping push forward China’s market
economy reforms.27
The EBL 2006 has three main procedures to deal with companies in
trouble––Chapters 8 on reorganisation, 9 on compromise and 10 on
22Chen (n 13) 163 (calculating the subsidies to China’s listed companies from governments between 1993
and 2003).
23J Zhou, ‘China’s Stock Markets Distorted by Government Subsidies’ Guangming Daily (24 April 2014) 2.
24X Zhang and CD Booth, ‘Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market Economy: The Shenzhen Experi-
ence’ (2001) 15 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1.
25See S Li, ‘Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years’ (2006) 2 Harvard Asia Quarterly 1.
26See W Wang, ‘Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes’ (1998) 9 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 234.
27See CD Booth, ‘The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally Over’ (2008) 20 Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 275.
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liquidation. Many have argued that the EBL 2006 is rescue-oriented;28 indeed,
a number of its pro-rescue mechanisms can be easily identiﬁed.
1. Encouraging the use of the corporate reorganisation procedure
First, the EBL 2006 Article 2 allows all companies in distress to ﬁle for reorgan-
isation, whatever a small or large company.29 This is different from neighbour-
ing jurisdictions like Japan and Taiwan where only public companies are
eligible for a formal reorganisation procedure.30
Second, under EBL 2006 Article 7, both the debtor and its creditors can
directly ﬁle for reorganisation before a court. And even in the case of an
ongoing liquidation procedure ﬁled by a creditor, under EBL 2006 Article
70, the debtor or its shareholders could apply to convert it into a reorganis-
ation procedure.
Third, and more importantly, to promote early rescues, the EBL 2006 Article
2 allows a company which is not bankrupt but is likely to be bankrupt to enter
into the reorganisation procedure. This suggests that a Chinese company
ﬁling for reorganisation does not need to demonstrate the existence of insol-
vency, which in turn may considerably encourage early rescue ﬁlings.31
2. China’s debtor-in-possession
Unlike in a liquidation or compromise procedure where it is always a court-
appointed administrator in charge of the company’s businesses and
assets,32 under EBL 2006 Article 73, the debtor in a reorganisation procedure
can request for debtor-in-possession, and if approved by the court, the debtor
itself can manage the company and reorganisation affairs afterwards.33 It is
the Chinese version of debtor-in-possession.
28Some articles shed light on China’s new rescue-centred Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. E.g. R Parry and H
Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 113; Booth, (n 27); Lee (n 5) 939; Ren, ‘The Control Model’ (n 5) 177.
29Z Jia, ‘Issues of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Bill’ (2006) 7 The China People’s Congress Gazette 575, 577
(noting that the new reorganisation law is open to businesses having the independent legal status).
30See T Eisenberg and S Tagashira, ‘Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from Japan’ (1994) 23 the
Journal of Legal Studies 111; JK Winn, ‘Creditors’ Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of Corporate Reorgan-
ization Law in the United States and the Republic of China’ (1988) 13 North Carolina Journal of Inter-
national Law and Commercial Regulation 409.
31H Zou, ‘China’s Corporate Rehabilitation System: Theories and Application’ (2007) 25 Journal of China
University of Political Science and Law 48, 53 (noting that a company which is likely to be bankrupt
can ﬁle for reorganisation under the EBL 2006); S Li, ‘Drafting of New Bankruptcy Law and Credit
Culture and Credit System of China’ (2005) 1 The Jurist 12, 15 (arguing that a company likely to be bank-
rupt can ﬁle for reorganisation under the new bankruptcy law); G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law: An
Anglo-American Perspective (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2008) 123 (noting that a company ﬁling for reor-
ganisation in the USA is not required to be insolvent).
32EBL 2006 Article 13.
33See generally M Falke, ‘China’s New Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy: A Story with a Happy End?’ (2007) 16
International Insolvency Review 63.
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But China’s debtor-in-possession is somewhat different from its counter-
part under the US Chapter 11 at least on two aspects.34 First, China’s
debtor-in-possession is not automatic or straightforward,35 since it must
be requested by the debtor and approved by the court after a reorganis-
ation procedure has already been commenced. Therefore, literally, if there
is no request, or the request is rejected, it is still the court-appointed
administrator who stays in control. It is a conditional debtor-in-possession.
Second, China’s debtor-in-possession, if granted, should be supervised by
the previously-court-appointed administrator. Interestingly, such a structure
is similar to what appears in the German corporate reorganisation law.36
Inspired by the German bankruptcy law, China’s lawmakers expect to use
the supervision of the administrator to curb the potential abuse of
debtor-in-possession.37
3. Creditor protection in reorganisation plans
Under EBL 2006 Article 79, a reorganisation plan must be proposed within six
months, and a three-month extension can be granted by court. To vote on a
reorganisation plan, creditors are mandatorily divided into four classes: the
secured, employee, tax and unsecured creditor class.38 The plan is accepted
if it has been voted for by both a simple majority in number of creditors
and a two-third majority in claims in each class.39
To a secured creditor, under EBL 2006 Article 87, its debt will be fully hon-
oured within the value of encumbered assets. Employee claims are given the
priority over tax ones after which the residual value will go to unsecured
creditors.
To make sure that creditors, especially unsecured creditors, are protected,
the EBL 2006 Article 87 requires that the creditor-best-interest test, according
to which creditors must be paid not less than in a hypothetical liquidation,
must be passed if a non-consensual reorganisation plan seeks the court
approval.40 At the same time, the absolute priority principle, which allows
34See a comprehensive discussion of the US Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession in Warren and Lawrence (n 4,
esp ch 8.
35Ren, ‘The Control Model’ (n 5) 178–9 (discussing China’s version of the debtor-in-possession).
36K Kamlah, ‘The New German Insolvency Act: Insolvenzordnung’ (1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law
Journal 417, 432 (noting that in Germany the debtor-in-possession must be monitored by the
administrator).
37W Wang, ‘The Draft of the New Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Corporate Governance’ (2005) 2 The
Jurists 5, 7 (noting that why China’s debtor-in-possession is designed to be supervised by an
administrator).
38EBL 2006 art 82.
39EBL 2006 art 84.
40X Wang, ‘Improving the Corporate Reorganization Regime’ (2010) 10 Journal of Kunming University of
Science and Technology 28, 33 (noting that the creditor-best-interest test must be passed when a
non-consensual reorganisation plan seeks court approval, and arguing this test should also be used
in a consensual plan submitted for approval).
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creditors to be paid before shareholders, must be applied for if a non-consen-
sual reorganisation plan is submitted for court approval.41
It can be argued that there are too many similarities between China’s new
corporate reorganisation law and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978,
since China heavily borrowed Chapter 11 when making its own corporate
rescue law.42 But the great challenge to China is how to implement the
new law in practice.
Section C: corporate reorganisation of China’s listed companies
Shortly after the EBL 2006 came into force on 1 June 2007, some listed com-
panies in China began to use this law for restructuring. Before reporting the
main characters of these cases, two basic criteria used to selecting them
should be clariﬁed.
First, this article only focuses on the reorganisation of China’s companies
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which means
the reorganisation of China’s companies listed abroad, in Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and the USA, are not included,43 since the latter is processed in a some-
what different way. By this benchmark, for instance, the reorganisation of
Zhejiang Glass Limited,44 a Chinese company listed on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange, is not included in this study.
Second, this article investigates the reorganisation of companies which are
still listed at the time of reorganisation. This means that the reorganisation of
companies which have been delisted before the commencement of the reor-
ganisation procedure is excluded. Take one case for example: the reorganis-
ation of Shenyang Tehuan Limited, which took place in 2011, is excluded,
since the company had been delisted from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
since 2004. In fact, up until now, there are only two such cases after the
EBL 2006 came into force.45
By these two criteria, this article identiﬁes the reorganisations of 43 of China’s
domestically listed companies, which were accepted by the Chinese courts
between 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2013, as demonstrated in Table 1.
Twenty-ﬁve of these companies are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
and 18 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, as demonstrated in Figure 2. Their
main characters can be summarised as follows.
41Lee (n 5) 969 (noting that the absolute priority principle must be conformed to in a non-consensual reor-
ganisation plan under EBL 2006 art 87).
42See Parry and Zhang (n 28) 113.
43See generally China’s companies listed abroad at M Humphery-Jenner, ‘The Governance and Perform-
ance of Chinese Companies Listed Abroad: An Analysis of China’s Merits Review Approach to Overseas
Listings’ (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 333–65.
44See D Ren, ‘Listing Pioneer Zhejiang Glass Faces Bankruptcy’ South China Morning Post (18 April 2011)
<http://www.scmp.com/article/965424/listing-pioneer-zhejiang-glass-faces-bankruptcy> accessed 16
October 2014.
45One is the Shenyang Tehuan Ltd, and the second is Liaoning Zhongliao International Ltd.
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Table 1. China’s listed company reorganisations (Accepted between 1 June 2007 and 31
December 2013).
Company Court Accepted on Listed at
Chaohua The 2nd Intermediate Court, Chongqing 16 November 2007 Shenzhen
Xingmei The 3rd Intermediate Court, Chongqing 11 March 2008 Shenzhen
Xiaxing Xiamen Intermediate Court, Fujian 15 September 2009 Shanghai
Taibai Jiayuguan Intermediate Court, Gansu 30 November 2011 Shenzhen
Zhonghua Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong 12 October 2012 Shenzhen
Chuangzhi Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong 12 August 2010 Shenzhen
Hualong Yangjiang Intermediate Court, Guangdong 10 March 2008 Shanghai
Kejian Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong 8 October 2011 Shenzhen
Taifeng Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong 10 November 2009 Shenzhen
Shenrun Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong 14 April 2010 Shenzhen
Xingtai Panyu Lower Court, Guangzhou, Guangdong 11 March 2009 Shanghai
Beishen Beihai Intermediate Court, Guangxi 27 November 2008 Shanghai
Baoshuo Baoding Intermediate Court, Hebei 3 January 2008 Shanghai
Chuanghua Chuangzhou Intermediate Court, Hebei 16 November 2007 Shanghai
Dixian Chende Intermediate Court, Hebei 10 November 2008 Shenzhen
Beiya Ha’erbin Intermediate Court, Heilongjiang 28 January 2008 Shanghai
Guangming Yichun Intermediate Court, Heilongjiang 9 November 2009 Shenzhen
Xin’an Jiaozuo Intermediate Court, Henan 7 November 2008 Shenzhen
Tianfa Jinzhou Intermediate Court, Hubei 13 August 2007 Shenzhen
Tianyi Jinzhou Intermediate Court, Hubei 12 August 2007 Shanghai
Deheng Liaoyuan Intermediate Court, Jilin 13 April 2010 Shanghai
Lanbao Changchun Intermediate Court, Jilin 16 November 2007 Shenzhen
Shijian Yanbian Intermediate Court, Jilin 30 December 2011 Shanghai
Danhua Dandong Intermediate Court, Liaoning 13 May 2009 Shenzhen
Jingchen Jinzhou Intermediate Court, Liaoning 22 May 2012 Shenzhen
Jinhua Huludao Intermediate Court, Liaoning 19 March 2010 Shenzhen
Guangxia Yinchuan Intermediate Court, Ningxia 16 September 2010 Shenzhen
Changling Baoji Intermediate Court, Shaanxi 14 May 2008 Shenzhen
Pianzhuan Xianyan Intermediate Court, Shaanxi 25 November 2009 Shenzhen
Qingling Tongchuan Intermediate Court, Shaanxi 23 August 2009 Shanghai
Jiufa Yantai Intermediate Court, Shandong 28 September 2008 Shanghai
Hailong Weifang Intermediate Court, Shandong 18 May 2012 Shenzhen
Hongshen Xi’an Intermediate Court, Shaanxi 27 October 2011 Shanghai
Huayuan The Second Intermediate Court, Shanghai 27 September 2008 Shanghai
Yuanfa The second intermediate court, Shanghai 30 August 2010 Shanghai
Fangxiang Neijiang Intermediate Court, Sichuan 7 December 2010 Shenzhen
Jingding Leshan Intermediate Court, Sichuan 23 September 2011 Shanghai
Haina Hangzhou Intermediate Court, Zhejiang 14 September 2007 Shenzhen
Changhang Wuhan Intermediate Court, Hubei 26 November 2013 Shenzhen
Zhongda Wuxi Intermediate Court, Jiangsu 26 April 2013 Shanghai
Xingye Huludao Intermediate Court, Liaoning 31 January 2013 Shenzhen
Xianchen Xining Intermediate Court, Qinghai 18 June 2013 Shanghai
Zhongji The 6th Intermediate Court, Xinjiang Army 19 October 2012 Shenzhen
Source: author’s data collection
Figure 2. Reorganisations of Chinese listed companies (2007–2013). Source: author’s
data collection.
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1. Bureaucracy in commencing a listed company reorganisation
procedure in China
Under EBL 2006 Article 2, in theory, it is quite simple and straightforward to
commence a reorganisation procedure: both the company and its creditors
can ﬁle for reorganisation before a court if the company is bankrupt or is
likely to be bankrupt, as noted before, and the court is liable to accept
or reject the ﬁling within 15 days; in the event of rejection, under the
EBL 2006 Article 12, an appeal can be made to a higher court. But in
reality meeting these terms is not enough to commence a listed
company reorganisation procedure, and the following extra requirements
must be met.
First, a local court must get the permission of the China Supreme People’s
Court before accepting a listed company reorganisation ﬁling. Such a restric-
tion only applies for listed companies. Literally, this restriction cannot be
found in the EBL 2006.
To identify where this restriction is from, this article managed to ﬁnd a con-
ference speech made on 30 May 2007 by the then deputy president of the
China Supreme People’s Court, Mr Xi Xiaoming. Mr Xi stated that local
courts must obtain the Supreme Court’s permission before accepting a
listed company reorganisation ﬁling.46 Five years later, in 2012, the
Supreme Court reiterated this requirement in a judicial notice.47 But, up
until now, there has not been any justiﬁcation publicly disclosed by the Court.
Little is known about the real intention of the Supreme Court to setting up
such a restriction. It is a very high barrier, which may deter reorganisation
ﬁlings, thereby against the pro-rescue spirits of the EBL 2006.48 In fact,
under EBL 2006 Article 10, whether to accept a reorganisation petition is
fully at the discretion of a local court, and the law clearly authorises the
local court to assess the merits of petitions and to decide whether the reor-
ganisation procedure can be commenced, regardless of a petition for a
listed or a private company.
But in reality, China’s local courts are unable––or unwilling––to cite EBL
2006 Article 10 to defend their statutory discretion,49 and therefore have to
46X Xi, ‘Enhancing the Roles of Courts in Pursuit of Socialist Harmony’ (the National Court Conference on
Civil Disputes Adjudication, 30 May 2007, Nanjing, China) <http://wenku.baidu.com/view/
de1c054c852458fb770b56ce.html> accessed 17 October 2014.
47The China Supreme People’s Court, The Minutes of the Seminar on Listed Company Reorganizations
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ﬂb/ﬂfg/sfjs_8249/201312/t20131205_239353.htm> accessed 19
December 2013.
48See generally BL Liebman, ‘A Populist Threat to China’s Courts?’ in MYK Woo and ME Gallagher (eds),
Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China (Cambridge University Press, 2011, 269) .
49See T Gong, ‘Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary
China’ (2004) 4 The China Review 33 (arguing the lack of judicial accountability in China’s court
system); see also L Li, ‘The ‘Production’ of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision
Making in a One-Party State’ (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 848 (discussing the institutionalised judicial
corruption in China).
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seek the permission from the Supreme Court.50 One of the negative conse-
quences is that it takes too long for these ﬁlings to go through the acceptance
procedure.
Second, supporting statements in writing from both a local government
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission should be presented to
the court before the ﬁling can be accepted.51 Again, this requirement also
seems to be unlawful, since its legal basis could not be found on any statutes
or ofﬁcial documents. But this unwritten and court-imposed rule matters in
reality.
Courts may need support from local governments for a number of reasons.
At ﬁrst, the court needs the local government to tackle potential social stab-
ility troubles. More bluntly, this is because the local government is able to
deploy police forces, in case of protests caused by disgruntled creditors,
employees or individual shareholders in large numbers whose interests may
be signiﬁcantly affected in the reorganisation procedure.52 In nearly all reor-
ganisation cases in China, there is heavy riot police presence during the credi-
tors’ meetings. This reﬂects the anxiety of China’s authorities over the
vulnerability of the Chinese society internally.53
Also, for the court, a written supporting statement from the local govern-
ment can serve as a kind of political guarantee, which could shield the
court and especially the judges from being negatively assessed by the Com-
munist Party local committee, in the event of a protest launched by affected
parties. Social stability appears to be the top worry of China’s courts. Judges
will be disciplined or at least negatively assessed if a case-related protest
happens.54 This is also why China’s courts hesitate to handle cases which
involve individuals in large numbers. Without the special support of the
local government, the court would be too nervous to accept a listed
company reorganisation ﬁling, which always involves a large number of indi-
viduals who are employees, shareholders or creditors.55
Moreover, for the court, the local government’s involvement can make the
reorganisation procedure run more efﬁciently. In particular, the local govern-
ment can persuade or pressure banks, most of them state-owned and large
50See Howson (n 3) 955 (arguing that some government agencies in China tend to use internal notices to
replace statutes when regulatory actions are taken).
51The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, ‘The Survey on China’s Listed Company Reorganizations’ The
People’s Court Daily (3 March 2011) 8.
52See CF Minzner, ‘Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions’ (2006) 42 Stanford Journal
of International Law 103 (discussing Chinese courts’ worries about protests launched by litigants).
53See generally SL Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2008).
54See CF Minzner, ‘Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China’ (2009–10) 31
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 53 (noting that judges in China are assessed by
local governments and the results will determine the former’s promotion).
55See NC Howson, ‘Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts in R Peerenboom
(ed), Judicial Independence in China (Cambridge University Press 2010, 147) (noting that ‘even in the
context of corporate law application, Chinese courts may be seen acting in the service of state or
party policy and in contravention of the law’: 148).
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creditors, to make concessions and to vote in favour of the government-
backed reorganisation plan; thereby the reorganisation procedure can be con-
cluded more quickly.
In many cases, it was quite common for the local government to use the
China Banking Regulatory Commission local ofﬁce to establish an interim
bank committee comprising bank creditors. This committee will lead all
banks involved to take a coordinated action especially in voting on the reor-
ganisation plan. Securing the local government support largely means having
secured the support from large creditors. This can make the court more com-
fortable in conducting the reorganisation procedure.56
Turning to the support of the China Securities Regulatory Commission,
because this Commission has, through the two Stock Exchanges, a ﬁnal
say as to whether a listed company reorganisation proposal or plan meets
the listing requirements,57 the courts will have intense communications
with the Commission to make sure that the approved reorganisation plans
meet the regulatory requirements as well as to avoid embarrassment in
case the court-approved reorganisation plans are not recognised by the
Commission.
Soliciting the support from these three major public authorities can be
quite time-consuming. It should be noted that all the permissions must be
substantially requested by the applicant who ﬁles for reorganisation
rather than by the court. This begs the question which party could afford to
do so.
2. Applicants of China’s listed company reorganisations
Under EBL 2006 Articles 7 and 70, as noted before, a reorganisation procedure
can be entered into through two different routes. Out of all 43 cases, it is
found that there were six cases (14%) converted from existing liquidation pro-
cedures, three of them requested by the debtor and the other three by the
shareholder. The remaining 37 reorganisations (86%) were directly-ﬁled. Out
of these 37 directly-ﬁled, 36 of them (97%) were ﬁled by the creditors.
Bearing in mind that the six conversion cases were also originally ﬁled by
the creditors, hence, in total, as illustrated in Figure 3, 43 out of these 43 reor-
ganisation cases (98%) were initiated by the creditors.
Is this a sign that creditors in China had the initiative in using the new cor-
porate reorganisation law for a rescue outcome? If so, it can be a strong indi-
cator that creditors would be well protected in the subsequent reorganisation
56Zhang and Booth (n 24) 11–12 (noting that judges need extra government support in handling corpor-
ate bankruptcy cases in China).
57See generally G Chen and others, ‘Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence
from Enforcement Actions’ (2005) 24 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 451 (describing the relation
between China’s two stock exchanges and the China Securities Regulatory Commission).
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procedures. Since this question is ﬁrmly related with one of this article’s argu-
ments on creditor protection, a closer inspection is needed. Who were these
ﬁling creditors?
In spite of the difﬁculties in unveiling the status of these creditor applicants,
the author managed to ﬁnd that most of them were the related or inside
parties. By delving in the debtors’ annual reports and the relevant newspaper
coverage, the author identiﬁes that at the very least 22 of these 37 ﬁling credi-
tors (61%) were the debtors’ subsidiaries, shareholders or connected parties.
They were not ordinary creditors. For instance, in the reorganisation case of
Xiaxing Electronics Limited, according to the company’s disclosed reorganis-
ation materials,58 it seems that there was no connection between the
company and the ﬁling creditor, Xiamen Huoju Group Limited. However,
after trawling through the archive of the company’s annual reports, it soon
transpired that Huoju was in fact one of the company’s main shareholders.59
To the rest of the ﬁling creditors, their status remains missing. But in view of
the barriers in commencing a listed company reorganisation procedure, this
article ventures to speculate that most of them were likely to be insiders
or connected parties; namely, to ordinary creditors, it appears to be insur-
mountable to pushing a defaulting listed company into reorganisation in
China. This may cast a shadow on creditor protection.
Why did these reorganisations prefer to use the creditors’ name to ﬁle?
There are a number of reasons.
First, ﬁling under the name of a creditor can avoid convening an extraordi-
nary general meeting of shareholders. Under China’s Company Law 2005
Article 38, a special resolution must be passed by an extraordinary general
meeting of shareholders if the debtor company voluntarily ﬁles for
Figure 3. Applicants of China’s listed company reorganisations (2007–2013). Source:
author’s data collection.
58The Administrator of Xiaxing Electronics Ltd, ‘The Reorganization Plan of Xiaxing Electronics Limited’
<http://www.cninfo.com.cn/> accessed 19 October 2014.
59Xiaxing Electronics Ltd, The 2010 Annual Report <http://www.cninfo.com.cn/> accessed 19 October
2014.
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reorganisation. Given that a listed company usually has tens of thousands of
general public shareholders, convening a meeting at such a scale takes time
and incurs extra costs (though in practice a small number of them will attend
such a meeting). More importantly, the company must face the uncertainties
regarding the voting outcome if the meeting is held.
Before this burden, if the debtor can ﬁnd an alternative to circumvent this,
and if there is a creditor that the company can inﬂuence or control, undoubt-
edly the company will choose the creditor to ﬁle. The alternative is an easier
way to avoid costs as well as uncertainties.
Meanwhile, using a creditor to ﬁle for reorganisation can also avoid one of
the ﬁling hurdles exclusively imposed on debtors. Under EBL 2006 Article 8, if
reorganisation is ﬁled for by the debtor, the debtor is liable to prepare and
present a plan explaining how to deal with employee layoffs, potential or
real. The court assesses whether the layoff plan is appropriate and will then
decide whether to accept or reject the ﬁling. But such an employment protec-
tion plan is not required if the reorganisation petition is lodged by a creditor.
Hence, for both costs and convenience considerations, the debtor will do
whatever it can to ﬁnd a friendly creditor to give a hand.
Moreover, and more subtly, ﬁling for reorganisation under the name of a
creditor can also alleviate the accusation of bankruptcy abuse. This could
only be understood in the context of China’s bankruptcy system. Although
corporate bankruptcy in China has a very short history,60 it has long been
accused of being abused by debtors, especially former SOEs backed by
China’s local governments.61 If a bankruptcy procedure is initiated by the
debtor, creditors tend to be more sceptical about potential abuse. In other
words, a voluntary bankruptcy ﬁling by the debtor is likely to invite accusation.
In response, the debtor will try to use a creditor to ﬁle, since this can create an
impression that the debtor is forced to enter into a bankruptcy procedure
rather than proactively seeks to use bankruptcy. Clearly, to this end, the avail-
ability of a creditor who the debtor can control would be ﬁt for purpose.
Thus, using a creditor to ﬁle for reorganisation does bring the procedural
convenience for the debtor, but it may do little to the effectiveness or achiev-
ability of reorganisations.
3. Local governments in control of most listed company reorganisations
Under EBL 2006 Article 13, if a reorganisation ﬁling is accepted, an administra-
tor will be simultaneously appointed by the court to replace the debtor and to
60See an introduction to the history of China’s enterprise bankruptcy law in RW Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law
and Reform in the People’s Republic of China’ (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 2563.
61See Q Bao, ‘Shanghai Has No Bankruptcy Abuse Case’ People’s Daily 22 January 2002, 1 (noting the wide-
spread bankruptcy abuses in China, especially the bankruptcy of SOEs backed by conniving local
governments).
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 115
take control of the company’s businesses and assets. As to administrator can-
didacy, under Article 24, there are two options: a local-government-organised
liquidation committee or a licensed insolvency professional agency, including
law or accounting ﬁrms.
Regarding the administrator appointments in these 43 cases (as shown in
Figure 4), it is found that 36 of them (84%) saw the appointment made from
the local-government-organised liquidation committee, and the remaining
seven appointments (16%) from the licensed professional agencies. This
suggests that the local governments dominated most of these administrator
appointments.
As for the composition of the local-government-organised committees,
ﬁrst, without doubt, most individual members were ofﬁcials from different
local government departments. A typical case is the reorganisation of
Guangxi Beisheng Pharmaceutical Limited in which 11 out of the 13 commit-
tee members were the ofﬁcials from the nine local government departments,
including the legal, auditing, labour, economy, infrastructure, land, business
and banking authority.62
Second, all these committees were chaired by a local senior ofﬁcial, such as
a deputy mayor of the city. For example, in the aforementioned Beisheng
case, it was the deputy mayor, Mr Wen Zhen, of the local Baihai City Govern-
ment, Guangxi Province who headed the liquidation committee. In the case
where there was state equity, usually the director or deputy-director of the
local state-assets-management authority would chair the committee. In the
reorganisation of Xianyan Pianzhuan Limited, for example, it was Mr Wu
Lishen, the director of the local Xianyan City State-Assets-Management
Authority, who presided at the committee.63
Figure 4. Administrator appointments in China’s listed company reorganisations (2007–
2013). Source: author’s data collection.
62The Administrator of Guangxi Beisheng Pharmaceutical Ltd, ‘The Public Notice of Being Filed for
Reorganization’ <http://app.ﬁnance.ifeng.com/data/stock/ggzw.php?id=13456333&symbol=600556>
accessed 29 August 2013.
63Xianyan Pianzhuan Ltd, General Announcement on Reorganization (2009-040) <www.cninfo.com.cn>
accessed 1 November 2014.
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Third, given that reorganisation always involves legal issues, most of these
committees hired lawyers as committee members for advice.64 For example,
in the reorganisation of Jin Hua Group Chloro-Alkali Limited, Mr Yanling Liu, a
lawyer from the Beijing-based law ﬁrm King&Wood was hired as one of the
committee members. 65
In the rest of these committees where lawyers were not given the member-
ship, it could be easily identiﬁed that lawyers were instead hired as legal coun-
sels rather than as committee members in aid of reorganisation affairs. For
example, in the reorganisation of Xinjiang Chalkis Limited, the lawyers from
a Guangzhou-based law ﬁrm were contracted by the liquidation committee
to advise the case, although they were not formally appointed as the liquida-
tion committee members.66 Lawyer service was always needed, though they
participated in different ways.
For courts, however, appointing a local-government-organised liquidation
committee as the listed company reorganisation administrator remains very
controversial in China.
On the one hand, admittedly, EBL 2006 Article 24 does allow the court to
appoint such a committee as the administrator. But, as argued by two promi-
nent Chinese bankruptcy scholars, Professors Li Shuguang67 and Wang
Xinxin,68 who were also the draftsmen of the EBL 2006, the real intention of
Article 24 is to reserve such committees only for the bankruptcy of state
owned enterprises (SOEs); in other words, for the reorganisation case of a
non-SOE company, the court must appoint a licensed professional agency
as the administrator. Although most listed companies in China are former
SOEs, strictly speaking, they are no longer SOEs after being listed on the
stock exchanges. They have become public companies. Therefore, it seems
to be against the legislative intention of Article 24 for the court to make
such appointments.
On the other hand, in most cases, appointing these committees may also
lead to a conﬂict of interest and allegedly violates EBL 2006 Article 24. To
ensure the neutrality of an administrator, Article 24 stipulates that any party
who has a direct interest in the reorganisation is proscribed from being
64See Booth (n 27) 293 (noting that it was rare for lawyers to be included as government-organised liqui-
dation committee members which dealt with the bankruptcy of SOEs in the past under the EBL 1986 in
China)
65R Xu, ‘Jin Hua Entered into Reorganization Due to the Defaults on RMB 0.9 Billion Debt Payments’ Shang-
hai Stock Daily, 22 March 2010 <http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20100322/01097603768.shtml>
accessed 1 November 2014.
66The Administrator of Xinjiang Chalkis Ltd, ‘The Reorganization Plan of Xinjiang Chalkis Limited’ <http://
quotes.money.163.com/f10/ggmx_000972_1024455.html> accessed 1 November 2014.
67S Li, ‘Impacts of the New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law’ (2006) 6 Journal of East China University of Law and
Political Science 110, 111.
68X Wang, ‘Problems of Enhancing China’s Insolvency Practitioner System’ (2010) 9 Legal Research (Fa Zhi
Yan Jiu) 14. See also Parry and Zhang (n 28) 130 (arguing that appointing a local-government-organised
liquidation committee was retained for the bankruptcy of SOEs in the EBL 2006).
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appointed. However, as noted, most Chinese listed companies have state
shares and even half of them are directly equity controlled by the state. In
these circumstances, appointing a local-government-organised liquidation
committee as the administrator largely means appointing one shareholder
to do the job. Clearly, these appointments seem to be unlawful.
Interestingly, although in China it still remains a taboo to speciﬁcally criti-
cise authorities in public, the above rampant breaches were immediately
pointed out by China’s shareholder activists, who accused, on Internet
blogs, that it is a breach of EBL 2006 Article 24 for courts to make such
appointments.69 Unfortunately, the key weakness of China’s legal system is
that many institutions, including government-controlled law courts, do not
treat laws seriously,70 as a result of which these alleged breaches remain wide-
spread in listed company reorganisations.
Despite most cases using a local-government-organised liquidation com-
mittee as the administrator, it is not the end of the story, since the debtor-
in-possession may, as mentioned previously, in theory, be requested and
granted by the court,71 which means the local government would cede
control to the debtor, and this may somewhat alleviate the state dominance.
But, in practice, it is another story.
This article ﬁnds that, as indicated in Figure 5, out of these 43 reorganis-
ations were there only nine cases (21%) where debtor-in-possession was
requested and granted; accordingly, in the majority of the cases (79%), the
administrator remained in control. In other words, the landscape of the
local government dominance in China’s listed company reorganisations has
not been substantially changed by the theoretical prospect of debtor-in-
possession.
In many cases, the administrator––rather than debtor-in-possession––
seems to be the only one realistic option, since at least 16 out of all cases
(37%) saw the company’s business operation having ceased before the com-
mencement of reorganisation. This suggests that many formal rescues were
launched too late, and that it was impractical to rely on the debtor itself to
conduct the rescue by granting debtor-in-possession. Terminating the
69J Sanhu, ‘The Seven-Day Ordeal of Lodging a Petition in Harbin’ <http://lzb600705.blog.163.com/blog/
static/102776088200982071750660/> accessed 2 November 2014 (describing the insurmountable difﬁ-
culty of a retail shareholder activist lodging a petition in an effort to revoke the court’s appointment of
the administrator from the local-government-organised liquidation committee in the reorganisation of
Beiya Ltd, in which the state was the controlling shareholder).
70See Y Li, ‘Misunderstanding and Misuse of China’s Corporate Reorganization Regime, A Case of Beiwen in
Zhengzhou’ (2001) 3 Financial Law Forum 11, 17 (arguing that laws are not always treated seriously by
many state institutions in China). See also the World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2014 (the World
Justice Project 2014) 14–15 (ranking China as low as the 92nd of 99 countries in the world as to con-
straints on government powers). The weakness of China’s legal system can also be understood by
reading an excellent article at S Lubman, ‘Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years’
(2000) 20 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 383.
71See Ren, ‘The Control Model’ (n 5) 180 (describing the likelihood of the DIP under China’s EBL 2006).
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business operation was largely accompanied by the departure of the key
members of the debtor’s managing team.
Moreover, bearing in mind that the governments are the major share-
holders of most of China’s listed companies, for debtor companies, there
might be no difference between requesting debtor-in-possession and not.
Before the reorganisation procedure, the government controls the listed
company as the controlling shareholder, and after the formal rescue pro-
cedure commences, the government maintains its control under the name
of the administrator. Therefore, to the debtor, it may not be ﬁt for purpose
to apply for debtor-in-possession: most of them are continuously controlled
by the governments, no matter of being in or out of reorganisation.
Although there were nine cases using debtor-in-possession, they largely
existed in name only. That is to say: the debtor-in-possession was granted,
but the key decisions were still made by the administrator. For example, in
the case of Shaanxi Pianzhuan Ltd,72 it was the administrator, the govern-
ment-organised liquidation committee led by the local Xianyang State-
Assets-Management Authority, rather than the debtor who made the key
decisions about the reorganisation issues, including choosing the company
buyer, although the debtor-in-possession was artiﬁcially sanctioned.73 In
most cases, with debtor-in-possession granted, instead of being allowed to
fully control the company, the debtor was mainly retained to maintain the
day-to-day business operation. The control has been lost to the administrator,
and it has never really returned.74
To sum up, it was overwhelmingly the local government that controls listed
company reorganisation in China. This may pose considerable threat to the
Figure 5. Control models in China’s listed company reorganisations (2007–2013). Source:
author’s data collection.
72Shaanxi Pianzhuan Ltd, ‘General Announcement of the Debtor-in-Possession Approved’ (2009-042)
<http://quotes.money.163.com/f10/ggmx_000697_488151.html> accessed 2 November 2014.
73X Zhang, ‘The Rocky Road of Shaanxi Lianshi to Buy Pianzhuan’ China Times (15 May 2010) <http://
ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20100515/21367942646.shtml> accessed 2 November 2014.
74See WJ Woodward, Jr, ‘“Control” in Reorganization Law and Practice in China and the United States: An
Essay on the Study of Contrast’ (2008) 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 141, 147
(describing the difference of control models in China’s and US’s bankruptcy reorganisation laws).
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protection of creditors and minority shareholders and affect how the value of
these companies is equitably distributed.
4. Value distribution in China’s listed company reorganisations
With respect to value distribution, at the policy level, China might have the
most liberal legal framework on this. Under EBL 2006 Articles 81 and 87,
the two fundamental value distribution norms, the pari passu and absolute
priority principles, which are compulsory in liquidation, are only treated as
the default rules in reorganisation.75 That is to say that affected parties in reor-
ganisation can contract out of these two norms; the other side of the same
coin is that if a consensus cannot be reached, under EBL 2006 Article 87,
these two norms must be conformed with.
Before reporting how these two value distribution norms were applied, it
seems necessary to look at going-concern value preservation at ﬁrst. The cor-
porate reorganisation regime would be a total failure if going concern value
cannot be preserved.76
This article measures going-concern value preservation by calculating the
debt recovery rate for creditors. Out of all these 43 cases, secured debts were
fully honoured within the value of encumbered assets, and two classes of pri-
ority creditors––employee and tax authority––were also paid in full. This is a
huge success by the Chinese standard, since even secured debt could not
be fully paid in an ordinary company liquidation or dissolution case in
China, according to the World Bank.77 Therefore, the recovery rate here is
only a matter of unsecured creditors.
Reorganisation is designed to prevent piecemeal liquidation, hence, there was
always going-concern value preserved, since liquidation was avoided in all these
cases. In particular, zero returns to unsecured creditors have never happened. It is
a positive sign of the strength of China’s new corporate reorganisation law.
By compiling the unsecured creditors’ recovery rate of each case, this
article ﬁnds that the average recovery rate for unsecured creditors was
25.14%, which means on average unsecured creditors recovered 25.14% of
their claims in China’s listed company reorganisations. It does reﬂect a kind
of achievement. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁgure would be more encouraging if
compared with the recovery rate for unsecured creditors in China’s
company liquidations as a whole.
75See Ren, ‘Wealth Distribution’ (n 5) 97 (arguing value distribution in China’s corporate reorganisations)
76See an excellent article examining going concern value preservation in reorganisation at LM LoPucki,
‘The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s “The End of Bankruptcy”’
(2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 645.
77According to the World Bank data, in an ordinary liquidation case in China, secured creditors on average
recoup 36% of their claims. This also means that it is the norm for unsecured creditors to recoup zero in
China. See World Bank Group, ‘Resolving Insolvency’, DoingBusiness.org <http://www.doingbusiness.
org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency> accessed 14 January 2015.
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According to the existing literature,78 the average recovery rate for credi-
tors, including secured and unsecured creditors, in China’s corporate liquida-
tions is always lower than 10%. It is also widely observed that unsecured
creditors get zero returns in most corporate liquidation cases in China.79
Thus, compared with less than 10%, the 25.14% found here is something
which should be celebrated. Such a ﬁgure is also somewhat encouraging
even if an international comparison is made.
In the UK, according to an article contributed by Professor Armour and
others published in 2012, unsecured creditors on average recovered less
than 20.20% in randomly selected administrations (reorganisations);80 in the
USA, one study, which examines Chapter 11s conducted in New York and
Arizona from 1995 and 2001, ﬁnds that American unsecured creditors on
average realised 52% of their claims.81 The comparison between these
three jurisdictions is demonstrated in Figure 6, though it should be addressed
that such comparison is considerably simpliﬁed, since many background
factors have not been taken into account.
For example, the UK has a bank-centre corporate ﬁnancing system, as a
result of which many UK companies rely on bank lending secured under
various forms of securities including ﬂoating charges for ﬁnancing; in the
event of insolvency, the majority of the company value goes to meet the
claims of secured creditors, most of them banks, ﬁrst, which means that
little could be left for unsecured creditors. However, the USA has a well-devel-
oped equity market, which translates into the fact that many companies use
equity markets rather than banks to raise funds, and in the case of bankruptcy
because of the application of the absolute priority norm, creditors, especially
unsecured ones, are better-positioned. This may explain why unsecured credi-
tors recover at a higher rate in US Chapter 11s than in UK administrations.
China’s slightly higher recovery rate for unsecured debt than the UK’s
counterpart might be because that the Chinese companies studied here are
78Zhang and Booth (n 24) 10 (reporting that at least in Shenzhen the return to creditors in bankruptcy is
always less than 10%); Li (n 25) 1 (reporting that ‘the banks recovered only 10.1% of their loans’ in
Chinese company liquidations, and in view of the fact that some of bank loans were secured, the recov-
ery rate for unsecured debts would be deﬁnitely lower than 10%); X Wang, ‘A Character of Market
Economy’ (1999) 4 International Trade 37, 38 (reporting that the average recovery rate for creditors,
including secured and unsecured, in China’s company liquidations nationwide in 1997 is 6.63%); T
Zhou, China’s Financial Sector Problems: Risks Control and Prevention (Beijing, China Party School Publish-
ing House, 2002) 78 (reporting that in the surveyed bankruptcy cases the banks only recovered 9.30% of
their loans in China).
79See J Yan, ‘An Analysis of the Low Recovery Rate for Creditors in China’s Corporate Liquidations’ People’s
Court Daily (14 August 2014) <http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/08/id/1364746.shtml>
accessed 6 November 2014 (reporting that in the Zaozhuang prefecture of Shandong Province it was
the norm for creditors [except employees] to get zero returns in company liquidations from 2002 to
2014).
80J Armour, A Hsu and A Walters, ‘The Costs and Beneﬁts of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evi-
dence from the UK’ (2012) 8 Review of Law and Economics 101, 116.
81A Bris, I Welch and N Zhu, ‘The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorgan-
ization’ (2006) 61 The Journal of Finance 1253, 1289.
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all listed companies, which can be ﬁnancially stronger, whereas the UK com-
panies covered by the aforementioned study are ordinary businesses, most of
which are small and medium enterprises and might have no substantial assets
at the time of insolvency. Overall, this comparison is only aimed to give a
glimpse of unsecured debt recovery rates at the international level, rather
than to indicate the superiority of any jurisdictions in using corporate reorgan-
isation law.
Hence, generally speaking, it can be tentatively concluded that China’s cor-
porate reorganisation law has functioned well in preserving going concern
value at least in these listed company reorganisation cases. But preserving
value is one thing; distributing it is another. Now, attention turns back to
how the value is allocated.
First, as for the application of the pari passu principle, except three reorgan-
isations (Tianfa, Tianyi and Lanbao) which did not publicly disclose the rel-
evant information (as shown in Figure 7) it is found that pari passu was
applied in 17 out of the remaining 40 cases (42.5%), and in the rest of cases
(57.5%) it was relaxed. It is worth repeating that pari passu was only a
concern of unsecured creditors, since all other creditors––secured, employee
and revenue––were fully paid, as noted.
In general, the pari passu principle was relaxed in two forms. First, each
unsecured claim was broken into several parts, and a variety of recovery
rates applied to each of them. It is complex. An example is given to illustrate
this. In the case of Xiaxing Electronics Ltd, for instance, each unsecured claim
was divided into three parts: the ﬁrst RMB 10,000, the second between
RMB10,000 and RMB100,000, and the third over RMB100,000. The full repay-
ment applied for the ﬁrst RMB 10,000 of each unsecured claim, the second
part got a 50% return, and the third part was 6.15% repaid.82 Under this
plan, if an unsecured creditor only had a claim of less than RMB10,000, it
means that this creditor got a full recovery. But for an unsecured creditor
having a claim of RMB 1 million, the 100% recovery rate for the ﬁrst
Figure 6. Unsecured debt recovery rates in the UK, USA and China. Source: combined by
the author.
82The Administrator of Xiaxing Electronics Ltd, ‘The Reorganization Plan of Xiaxing Electronics Limited’
<http://www.cninfo.com.cn/ﬁnalpage/2009-11-25/57327719.PDF> accessed 7 November 2014.
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RMB10,000 was substantially negligible, since the majority of its debt was
covered by the lower repayment rate of 6.15%. Under this form, obviously,
small unsecured creditors beneﬁted; large ones did not.
Unlike the ﬁrst form, the second was made exclusively in favour of small
unsecured creditors. In this situation, unsecured creditors were regrouped
according to the amount of their claims, and different recovery rates were
made for different groups. The main point was that small creditors got
more. For instance, in the case of Hua Yuan Titanium Dioxide Ltd, unsecured
creditors were separated into two groups: the ﬁrst group each of them having
the claim of less than RMB 6 million, and the second group each having more
than RMB 6 million. The ﬁrst group was 70% repaid, and the second was
41.69% repaid. Unsecured creditors with relatively smaller claims were par-
ticularly favoured.
Whatever the forms of departure, pari passu was relaxed in favour of small
unsecured creditors. This begs the question why the administrator, who for-
mulated the plan but was not appointed by small unsecured creditors, tried
to please this group of creditors. Two factors may offer a partial explanation.
First, the administrator needed the votes of the small unsecured creditors
to pass the reorganisation plan. The number of these small creditors matters.
As mentioned, the reorganisation plan is not passed unless it is voted for by a
majority of affected parties in number of each class. With the favourable
recovery rate and even the full repayment provided, it seems unlikely for
the small unsecured creditors to vote down the reorganisation plan. This is
what the administrator expected to see.83 Arguably, these creditors were
bribed to vote for the administrator-proposed reorganisation plan.
Second, paying small unsecured creditors more was also aimed to prevent
protests or at least to make protests less likely. Again, this could only be
Figure 7. Application of the pari passu principle (2007–2013). Source: author’s data
collection.
83See JR Franks, KG Nyborg and WN Torous, ‘A Comparison of US, UK, and German Insolvency Codes’
(1996) 25 Financial Management 86, 94–5 (noting that in Germany occasionally small unsecured credi-
tors are paid in full to secure the approval of the reorganisation plan).
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understood in the context of China. Chinese creditors may protest in the court
house or directly march to the government if they feel badly treated.84 This
scenario is precisely what the local government and the court are afraid of
and will do their best to avoid. Protests are treated seriously as political
threats to the one-party regime.85 Paying some creditors in full or more
favourably is clearly a divide-and-conquer strategy, since the creditors who
are paid in full will leave, which can in turn reduce the number of potential
trouble-makers. The administrator, behind whom are the local government
and the court, decided to pay some creditors more to buy peace.
This strategy worked very well in some cases. For example, in the reorgan-
isation of Guangxi Beishen Pharmacy Ltd, under its proposed reorganisation
plan, the ﬁrst RMB50,000 of each unsecured claim was fully repaid, and this
meant that 122 out of all 226 unsecured creditors (54%) got full recovery.
So, with over half of unsecured creditors ﬁnancially satisﬁed entirely, even if
there was a protest, at least its scale could be more manageable or contain-
able for both the court and the local government.86
But the real concern here is that the local government under the name of
the administrator was using the money of large unsecured creditors to pursue
its own agenda. And the same tactic was also used in dealing with the absol-
ute priority principle.
Turning to the absolute priority principle, compared with the departure
from pari passu, which happened in some half of all cases, the departure
from absolute priority was the norm rather than the exception in all these
cases. Precisely, in all 43 listed company reorganisations, shareholders
retained part or whole of their equity in the reorganised company, although
creditors, especially unsecured creditors, were not paid in full.
By and large, the departure was operated in two ways. First, the equity of
shareholders remained intact, whereas unsecured creditors had to fully
shoulder reorganisation costs. This occurred in 9 out of all 43 cases (21%).
For example, in the case of Guangdong Hualong Groups Ltd, the equity of
all shareholders was untouched, while the unsecured creditors only recovered
13% of claims each.87 It should be noted that most of such deviations hap-
pened in the years 2007 and 2008, when the EBL 2006 was ﬁrst implemented.
As time went on, presumably, it was increasingly realised that this way was
excessively unfair to creditors; then the second way emerged later.
84CF Minzner, ‘China’s Turn Against Law’ (2011) 59 The American Journal of Comparative Law 935, 946
(noting that in China land seizures and corporate reorganisations of failed enterprises may generate
mass citizen discontent or social unrest).
85See generally PS Jha, Managed Chaos: The Fragility of the Chinese Miracle (Los Angeles, Sage, 2009).
86The Administrator of Guangxi Beishen Pharmacy Ltd, ‘The Reorganization Plan of Guangxi Beishen Phar-
macy Limited’ <http://www.cninfo.com.cn/ﬁnalpage/2009-02-23/49439063.PDF> accessed 8 November
2014.
87Guangdong Hualong Groups Ltd, ‘General Announcement of the Reorganization Progress’ <http://www.
cninfo.com.cn/ﬁnalpage/2008-04-26/39207361.PDF> accessed 8 November 2014.
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In the second way (taking place in the remaining 79% of cases), instead of
being shielded from bearing any costs, shareholders were required to
concede part of their equity to increase the unsecured debt recovery rate.
For example, in the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited, two controlling
shareholders surrendered 10% of their shares, and the rest of shareholders,
including the general public shareholders, conceded 8% each; as a
result, the returns to the unsecured creditors were increased by 6.31% to
30.67%.88
Unlike the departure from absolute priority in US Chapter 11s, China’s
version of the departure seems to have gone too far. In US listed company
Chapter 11s, the departure from absolute priority did happen in many
cases, but usually only a less than 5% of the company’s value goes to old
equity holders in order to reach a desirable consent.89 In this circumstance,
however, the majority of the old equity will be cancelled. On the contrary,
in China’s listed company reorganisations, the majority of old equity will be
retained. This is the key difference between these two jurisdictions.
One may ask the question why the absolute priority principle seemed to be
ignored in all these cases. Again, this is because of China’s social stability con-
cerns. As early as April 2006, two months before the EBL 2006 took effect, one
senior judge of the China Supreme People’s Court, Mr Song Xiaoming, gave a
presentation in a high-level international conference, the 5th Forum for Asian
Insolvency Reform (FAIR), stating that in a listed company reorganisation case
‘a certain proportion of stock equities should be reserved for medium and
small investors (shareholders)’, whether the company is solvent or insolvent,
and that this is to ‘perform the function to maintain social stability’.90 In
other words, the Supreme Court is of view that in listed company
reorganisations the absolute priority principle must be relaxed in the
interest of medium and small shareholders. Presumably, Song’s speech
has been circulated to all Chinese courts, since except this document,
there is no legally-binding bylaw which could be identiﬁed to justify the wide-
spread departure from absolute priority in China’s listed company
reorganisations.91
But this policy gives rises to two immediate problems. First, it contradicts
the EBL 2006 Article 87. Under Article 87, as mentioned before, absolute pri-
ority is a default rule. In all reorganisation cases, it can be relaxed subject to
consent between creditors and shareholders. But the Supreme Court says
88Shenzhen China Bicycle Ltd, ‘The Reorganization Plan of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited’ <http://www.
cninfo.com.cn/ﬁnalpage/2013-11-08/63248707.PDF> accessed 8 November 2014.
89LM LoPucki and WGWhitford, ‘Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies’ (1990) 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 125, 142–3.
90X Song, ‘The Courts Role in Enterprise Bankruptcy Proceedings and Restructuring in China’ (5th Forum for
Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR), Beijing, China, 27–28 April 2006).
91See Howson (n 3) 971 (noting some law enforcement guidelines issued by China’s administrative auth-
orities are directly contrary to the statute).
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that in listed company reorganisations it must be relaxed regardless of
consent reached or not. This policy is controversial,92 since it is against EBL
2006 Article 87.
Second, this policy has been expansively used and even abused by con-
trolling shareholders at the expense of both unsecured creditors and general
public shareholders. According to this policy, it is medium and small inves-
tors that are given special protection for the sake of preventing social
unrest. In the context of China’s securities markets, these investors are the
general public who register as investors in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges and become shareholders of certain of listed companies. It
seems clear that controlling and institutional shareholders are not on this
special protection list. But the reality is that all shareholders used this
policy to retain their equity.
To sum up, China’s new reorganisation law did show its strength in preser-
ving going-concern value in the listed company reorganisations, since at least
it doubled the returns to unsecured creditors by avoiding piecemeal liquida-
tions. But concerns are raised in distributing value, as the two fundamental
value distributional norms were often relaxed for political considerations. In
some cases, the company’s value was distributed quite unfairly. In the
event of unfairness, the court is empowered to correct this when approving
the reorganisation plan at the last stage.
5. Court approval of reorganisation plans
As noted, there are two different procedures made to approve consensual and
non-consensual reorganisation plans respectively. For a consensual one that
has been accepted by all classes of affected parties through a vote, under
EBL 2006 Article 86, the court will approve it if it generally complies with
the EBL 2006. Article 86 does not specify what criteria the reorganisation
plan must meet;93 probably the law is intended to give the full discretion to
the court. This is called a normal approval.
By contrast, where there is a non-consensual reorganisation plan that
has been voted down by one or more than one class of affected parties,
EBL 2006 Article 87 provides a list of conditions for the plan to meet. If
the plan fails to meet one of them, the court will reject the plan and
force the company into liquidation. This article summarises these
92Mr Xiaohong Chen, director of The China State Council Enterprise Research Centre, expresses his view
that the absolute priority principle must be complied with in listed company reorganisations: see M
Chaoyan and A Zhen, ‘Reorganization Following Bankruptcy, A New Path of Rehabilitation Created by
Lan Bao’ Huaxia Daily (29 December 2007) <http://business.sohu.com/20080102/n254421868.shtml>
accessed 18 January 2015.
93X Wang, ‘Theories and Practices of Corporate Reorganization’ (2012) 11 Journal of Law Application (Fa Lv
Shi Yun) 10, 15 (noting that the EBL 2006 is silent on the criteria which a court can use to approve a
consensual reorganisation plan).
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conditions as the four tests, which are very similar to those in the US
Chapter 11s.94
The ﬁrst is the creditor-best-interest test, which requires that creditors be
paid not less than in a hypothetical liquidation; the second is the pari passu
test, which stipulates that creditors within the same class (mainly unsecured
creditor class) must be paid pro rata; the third is the absolute priority test,
which indicates that absolute priority must be complied with;95 the ﬁnal is
the feasibility test, which, as demonstrated by its name, means that the
plan must be feasible.96 If all of these four tests are passed, the court may
approve––and force dissenting parties to accept––the reorganisation plan.
In the language of the corporate reorganisation law, it is called a cram-
down approval.
In these 43 cases, all reorganisation plans were approved by the courts; no
rejection has been found. In other words, the court conﬁrmation of reorgan-
isation plans seemed to be guaranteed in China. In particular, the normal
approval was used in 31 cases (72%), and the cram-down approval was
seen in the remaining 12 cases (28%).
As for the normal approval in these 31 cases, at ﬁrst glance, the court
seemed to have done the right things, since all classes of affected parties
had voted for the proposed plan. But great unfairness might be hidden,
and this is mainly because of the oversimpliﬁed, deeply-ﬂawed EBL 2006
Article 82 on how to form the class of unsecured creditors.97
Under Article 82, creditors are divided into four classes––secured,
employee, tax and unsecured––to vote on a reorganisation plan. But the
key problem of this Article is that it is silent on whether an unsecured creditor
who is an insider should abstain from voting as an ordinary unsecured credi-
tor, or whether a new class should be formed to accommodate these insider
parties.98 Without categorising unsecured creditors further, the majority rule is
artiﬁcially followed, but in substance, the voting outcome might be manipu-
lated by the insiders under the guise of the ordinary unsecured creditors. The
China Supreme People’s Court knows this, but no any policy action has been
94Warren and Westbrook (n 4) esp ch 8.
95Wang (n 93) 18 (noting that absolute priority must be complied with in the case of a cram-down
approval under EBL 2006 Article 87).
96These tests are probably directly borrowed from the Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978. See 11
USC Sec 1129, and detailed discussion of this in KN Klee, ‘All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram
Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code’ (1979) 53 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 133, 136–7 (describ-
ing the similar tests used by American bankruptcy courts to assess reorganisation plans).
97See Falke (n 33) 74 (noting that many gaps are left in the EBL 2006 and may lead to difﬁculties in the
implementation of this law).
98See DC Cohn, ‘Subordinated Claims: Their Classiﬁcation and Voting under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code’ (1982) 56 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 293, 295–301 (discussing claim subordinations in
Chapter 11s).
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made until now.99 Realistically, although China has no formal claim-
subordination rules, courts can use the general principle of equity embedded
in China’s Civil Law 1986 Article 4 to restrict insiders from voting as ordinary
unsecured creditors.
A typical case can demonstrate the potential inequity caused by not
excluding insiders from the class of unsecured creditors. In the case of Shenz-
hen China Bicycle Ltd,100 the largest unsecured creditor, Shenzhen Guoshen
Energy Ltd, holding the RMB 0.46 billion debt representing 26% of the unse-
cured claims, was included in the class of unsecured creditors to vote, but
Guoshen was also the company’s controlling shareholder.101 With debtor-
in-possession granted in this case, it means that the reorganisation plan
was made by Guoshen and then was substantially approved by itself but
under a different name as an ordinary unsecured creditor. Inevitably, the
voting result had been considerably affected, if not manipulated, by
Guoshen. For the purpose of equity, ideally, Guoshen should be barred at
least from voting as an ordinary unsecured creditor.
Regarding the cram-down approval in the remaining 12 cases, unfortu-
nately, they are the real negative examples of China’s version of the rule of
law.102 As mentioned before, under EBL 2006 Article 87, a cram-down
approval cannot be sanctioned if the absolute priority test is not passed.
But, given the automatic departure from absolute priority in all China’s
listed company reorganisations, clearly, all cram-downs here violated the
EBL 2006, because they failed in passing the absolute priority test.103 The
most serious concern is that some cram-downs were in fact supported and
agreed with by the China Supreme People’s Court, according to Professor Li
Shuguang, a leading Chinese bankruptcy scholar.104
Moreover, in these 12 cram-downs, at least there were six cases where the
pari passu principle was also relaxed; again, it was a violation of EBL2006
Article 87, since they failed in passing the pari passu test noted above.
99M Liu and H Chi, ‘Cram-downs in Chinese Company Reorganization’ (2011) 10 Journal of Law Application
81, 85 (the author Min Liu is a judge in China’s Supreme Court, and he noticed the widespread abuses
made by insiders as unsecured creditors when voting on the reorganisation plan).
100Shenzhen China Bicycle Ltd, ‘Announcement on the Voting Result of the Second Creditors Meeting’
<http://ﬁnance.ifeng.com/a/20130823/10504488_0.shtml> accessed 10 November 2014.
101Z Zhen, ‘We Must Proscribe the Zhonghua Reorganization Scandal from Being Repeated’ China Stock
Daily (24 October 2013) <http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201310/t20131024_4180435.html>
accessed 10 November 2014 (mentioning that Guoshen held the RMB 0.46 billion unsecured claim
in the Zhonghua [China] reorganisation case).
102See generally R Peerenboom, ‘What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing, Pre-
dicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China’ (2005) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 823
(describing the development of China’s rule of law).
103See BL Liebman, ‘A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform’ in S Heilmann and
EJ Perry (eds), Mao’s Invisible Hand, The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Asian Centre, 2011) 177 (noting that China’s judges sometimes ignore
legal rules entirely when adjudicating cases).
104Y Liu and Y Gao, ‘Corporate Reorganization of Hai Ji Lv Jian’ China Stock Market Weekly (27 April 2009)
<http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2009/04/2711394859465.shtml> accessed 15 January 2015.
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With respect of the creditor-best-interest test, it seems that this test was
passed in all cram-down cases. In all reorganisations, there was a routine
assets valuation procedure. Licensed auditors were hired to evaluate the liqui-
dation value of the companies. At least from reading these reorganisation
plans, unsecured creditors were always paid more than in liquidation. For
example, the unsecured creditors of Hebei Baoshuo Limited recovered 13%
of their claims each, whereas according to the assets evaluation report, they
could only recover 10.12% if the company was liquidated.105
As for the feasibility test, since it is considerably subjective in nature, most
courts seemed to be unable to make a real judgement. In reality, it was more a
kind of formality for judges to insert a brief statement in the reorganisation
approval document that ‘the court is of view that the plan is feasible’. In
fact, no substantial assessment was made. Professor Zou Hailin, another
leading Chinese bankruptcy scholar, argued that assessing the feasibility of
a reorganisation plan involves business judgement and is beyond what
judges as legal professionals can do.106 Very few judges are business-
minded, which means the feasibility test is largely not used in practice.
After approving the reorganisation plan, the court will close the judicial
reorganisation procedure, and the debtor is liable to execute the reorganis-
ation plan.107 Under EBL 2006 Article 90, the administrator supervises the
plan’s execution.
To summarise, several main characters of the implementation of China’s listed
company reorganisations can be learnt. First, most of these cases were politically
driven,108 since local governments played the key role in supporting the com-
mencement of these cases and in controlling these companies in the reorganis-
ation process under the name of bankruptcy administrators. Second, these cases
reﬂected the less-developed rule of law in China, since many statutory rules were
not respected by public authorities including law courts. Third, the corporate
reorganisation law itself did show its strength in preserving going concern
value by preventing piece-meal liquidations, since the debt recovery rate was
considerably increased compared with in liquidations. But great unfairness lied
in distributing the preserved value. The following parts turn to the questions
who are winners and losers.
Section D: are unsecured creditors and general public
shareholders winners?
The answer looks to be afﬁrmative. To unsecured creditors, on the one hand,
bearing in mind the creditor-best-interest test, all of them were paid more
105The Administrator of Hebei Baoshuo Ltd, ‘The Reorganization Plan’.
106H Zou, ‘Uncertainties of Cram-Downs’ (2012) 11 Journal of Law Application 24, 25.
107EBL 2006 art 89.
108See an insightful discussion of this in JM Marsden and S Mui, ‘Local Concerns Outweigh Offshore Credi-
tors’ Interests in Chinese Restructurings’ (2014) 9 Journal of Corporate Renewal 23.
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than in liquidation, as reported above. On the other hand, on average, they
recovered 25.14% of their claims, whereas their counterparts in liquidations
could only recoup less than 10%. To general public shareholders (retail investors),
the majority of their equity was retained, and they were only in some cases
required to sacriﬁce a small portion of their equity to pacify unsecured creditors,
but they would have lost everything if these companies had been liquidated.
Thus, on the face of it, both unsecured creditors and general public shareholders
seemed to be the winners or beneﬁciaries, but this article points to the contrary.
1. Unsecured creditors were losers
An early study shows that the average unsecured creditors’ recovery rate in
Chinese corporate reorganisations as a whole, including both listed and
private company reorganisations, amounts to 33.67%.109 In view of the two
different recovery rates, one question arises: why do the unsecured creditors
in listed company reorganisations recover 25.14%, but the national average
for both listed and private company reorganisations is 33.67%? Listed compa-
nies are supposed to ﬁnancially stronger, because in China only the very
healthy companies are selected to be listed, and because the performance
of these companies is constantly monitored by the regulators to ensure ade-
quate protection of investors.110 In turn the unsecured creditors’ recovery rate
is supposed to be higher instead?
One of the causes is soon spotted: unsecured creditors in these cases were
served with a low recovery rate partly because the absolute priority principle
was routinely circumvented.
As noted, for political considerations, the China Supreme People’s Court
does not acknowledge absolute priority as a default rule in listed company
reorganisations.111 Instead, the Court makes clear that the absolute priority
principle must give way to maintaining social stability, thereby this fundamen-
tal value distribution norm is put upside down. Inevitably, unsecured creditors
bear the brunt of the Court’s decision.
This article ﬁnds that if the absolute priority principle could have had been
complied with, the average unsecured debt recovery rate could be increased
from the current 25.14% to 86.51%, and in 25 out of all 43 cases (61%) the unse-
cured creditors could get the full recovery. How are these ﬁgures generated?
To count how much more the unsecured creditors could get, it is vital to
determine the share price when the company is in the process of reorganis-
ation. This article mainly refers to the price-measuring methods used in the
existing reorganisation cases.
109Z Zhang, ‘Corporate Reorganization under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of
China: The Relevance of Anglo-American Models for China’ (PhD thesis, Durham University 2014) 127.
110See generally Fan, Wong and Zhang (n 2) 330.
111EBL 2006 art 87.
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Following this approach, if the share price is set in the reorganisation
plan, this article simply uses it to calculate the equity value of the
company. In the case where the share price is not shown in the reorganis-
ation plan, this article uses either the closing price at the date when trading
was suspended by the Exchange or the opening price at the date when the
company resumed trading, depending on which price is publicly available.
In addition, in some cases, the share price was generated from the average
price traded during the period of twenty market days prior to
its suspension. Choosing these methods is also because they were used
and preferred by many administrators in calculating share prices in
other reorganisation plans; in general, there is not a uniform method to
do so.
In addition, using the above share prices is also intended to make this
article’s argument more conservative and robust, since in most cases the
share prices soared after the conclusion of the reorganisation procedure;
if the post-reorganisation share price, which is always far higher than the
aforementioned depressed prices, is selected to calculate how much
should go to creditors, the vast majority of these cases may see the full
repayment to all unsecured creditors; but this cannot be quite reliable
due to the volatility of share prices in the equity market. For the sake of
being conservative, this article uses the above methods to count what
unsecure creditors are entitled, which are obviously less controversial.
The counting methods are very complex, and they are listed in detail in
Appendix 1.
By such methods, for example, in the case of Beishen Pharmacy Ltd, the
share price was ﬁxed at RMB3.00 per share in the reorganisation plan. Each
shareholder was required to surrender 23% of the shares to increase the
recoveries for unsecured creditors. As a result, unsecured creditors got a
50.44% recovery. But the real problem is that if the absolute priority
principle could be conformed to, the equity value of RMB911 million
retained in the hands of the old shareholders could be enough to pay
the cancelled unsecured debt of RMB515 million. In other words, in the
Beishen case, the unsecured debt recovery rate should be 100% rather
than the current 50.44% if the absolute priority principle was complied
with.
After obtaining all assumed recovery rates in these cases, this article
reaches the estimated ﬁgure that the average unsecured recovery rate
should be at 86.51% rather than the present 25.14%. Unsecured creditors
were not winners; instead they might be the largest losers.
Some may ask a ﬁrmly-related question why the company’s equity was still
valuable after the company had been ﬁnancially bankrupt. At this point,
equity is presumed to be worth nothing. It is strange indeed. Such a phenom-
enon does, however, exist in China; or it reﬂects the Chinese characters of its
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socialist market economy.112 In substance, the company’s equity value is
mainly because of its license to ﬂoat on the stock exchange, which is called
the shell value.113 Being allowed to ﬂoat on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai
Stock Exchange is more like a permanent membership. With delistings rarely
taking place, the equity of these companies were still highly valuable.
The second question is why unsecured creditors were so disadvantaged. A
number of reasons can explain this. At ﬁrst, as mentioned before, all these
cases were substantially initiated by the debtors themselves. Creditors,
especially unsecured creditors, were quite passive as to whether or when
the reorganisation procedure could be launched. In other words, it was the
intention and the initiative of the debtor to use the reorganisation procedure,
thus naturally it was unlikely for the debtor-initiated reorganisation procedure
to be pursued in favour of creditors.
Second, the reorganisation process was largely out of the creditors’ control,
which made them quite vulnerable. As noted, in most of the existing cases it
was the local-government-organised liquidation committee staying in charge
as the administrator. Creditors, including unsecured ones, did not have a say
on the appointment.114 Even the Chinese courts were unable to refuse to
appoint such committees, since courts are also somewhat controlled by the
governments. Some Chinese judges also complain about this.115 Admittedly,
in theory creditors could request the court to replace the incumbent admin-
istrator, but this has never happened in reality. The situation would be wor-
sened by the connection between local government and debtor, since in
most cases the local government was exactly the controlling shareholder.116
Arguably, it was a game played by and for the debtor.
Third, as a consequence of being unable to control the reorganisation
procedure, information for creditors was scarce; even when certain of the
company’s information was available eventually, but it usually reached
creditors too late. Without having information of the company, creditors
112China’s status of market economy is still not recognised by the EU and USA, so this article calls it a self-
styled market economy. See M Dalton, ‘Malmstrom: No Automatic Market Economy Status for China in
2016’ Wall Street Journal (11 December 2014) <http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/12/11/malmstrom-
no-automatic-market-economy-status-for-china-in-2016/> accessed 17 January 2014.
113See X Chen, C Jevons Lee and J Li, ‘Chinese Tango: Government Assisted Earnings Management’
Working Paper, Tulane University, New Orleans, USA, December 2003 <http://www.bm.ust.hk/~acct/
Incubator_Research_Camp/ChineseTango.pdf> accessed 18 January 2015.
114EBL 2006 art 22.
115X Jiang, ‘The Role of Administrators in Corporate Reorganization’ in X Wang and Z Yi (eds), The 2nd
National Bankruptcy Conference Collection (Beijing, Law Press, 2010, 176) (the judge author argues
that sometimes courts are pressured by governments to appoint the latter as administrators). See
also Shenzhen People’s Intermediate Court, Report on Handling Corporate Bankruptcy Cases <http://
www.szcourt.gov.cn/shenwu/view.aspx?id=4207> accessed 22 September 2012 (the court is of view
that courts must resist the pressure from local governments by not appointing the government-organ-
ised liquidation committees as administrators in bankruptcy).
116See Q Qiang, ‘Corporate Governance and State-Owned Shares in China Listed Companies’ (2003) 14
Journal of Asian Economics 771 (noting the ﬁrm control connection between China’s local government
and listed company).
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were easy to be manipulated. Under EBL 2006 Article 61, the administrator is
liable to provide an audited report of the company’s assets to the meeting of
creditors, but usually such a report was too skeletal for creditors to know
how many assets the company really had. For example, in the case of
Hebei Dixian Ltd, the company had 3,000 hectares of land but only admitted
324 hectares in its assets report; it seemed to be impossible for ordinary
creditors to verify such information.117 This was made public thanks to a
whistleblower, one of the company's senior managers, who reported this
to the China Securities Regulation Commission years after the reorganisation
procedure; both creditors and shareholders were shocked by what this
manager had made public.
The audited reports might lack details, but another problem is that they
always reached creditors too late. In practice, creditors were given a bundle
of reports only at the time when the meeting of creditors commenced.
Without having sufﬁcient time to digest these reports, usually one or two
hours later, they were required to vote on the reorganisation plan. Creditors
were angry, but they were, in extreme cases, revenged with violence after
they voted down a local-government supported reorganisation plan.118 To
some extent, it can be argued that creditors had no choice but to vote in
favour of a government-supported reorganisation plan.
In addition, the disadvantaged position of the unsecured creditors could
also be attributed to the weakness of the Chinese courts. Courts are supposed
to be the ultimate defenders of law. However, as argued by Professor Howson,
‘Chinese courts may be seen acting in the service of state or party policy and
in contravention of the law’.119 As reported earlier, at the very least, all cram-
down approvals issued by the courts were illegal, since these reorganisation
plans failed to pass the absolute priority test under the EBL 2006. Unfortu-
nately, the Chinese courts, including the Supreme Court, are unable, or unwill-
ing, to act as the defender of law. The vulnerability of the courts in turn makes
the creditors more vulnerable.
2. General public shareholders were not winners either
Like unsecured creditors, general public shareholders were not well protected
also because of the lack of representation.
To a large extent, most of the losses of general public shareholders are
made by controlling shareholders before reorganisation. As has been
117Q Wang, ‘Ex-Manager of Dixian Reports Business Irregularities to the National Regulator’ Shenzhen
Business News (8 December 2011) <http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20111208/070010955299.
shtml> accessed 18 January 2015.
118X Qin, ‘Lawyer Assaulted in the Debtor-Controlled Hongshen Reorganization’ Shanghai Stock Daily (17
April 2012) <http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20120417/012511839312.shtml> accessed 18 January
2015.
119Howson (n 55) 138.
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complained repeatedly by shareholder activists,120 if the company was not
abused by the controlling shareholders, the company would not go bankrupt
and did not need to resort to bankruptcy reorganisation for survival. For
example, in the case of Shandong Jiufa Food Ltd, the company’s ﬁnancial illi-
quidity was mainly because its controlling shareholder, Jiufa Group Ltd, took
away the company’s RMB0.79 billion cash illegally (tunnelling), as a result of
which the company collapsed eventually in 2008.121 Although the Chinese
securities regulator has started to crackdown such abuses from years ago, it
seems that it has not gone far enough.122
Turning to the general public shareholders, as mentioned, the company’s
equity was kept entirely intact in 11 cases. Thus, it seems at least in these
cases, shareholders, especially general public shareholders, were not victi-
mised by reorganisation. But, in the remaining 32 cases, which are the
focus of this section, the general public shareholders surrendered part of
their equity to support the rescue efforts, and this article ﬁnds that most of
these surrendered shares should not be conceded if the policy intention of
the China Supreme People’s Court could be faithfully materialised.
As analysed, the Supreme Court requires that the absolute priority principle
should be relaxed in favour of general public shareholders, not for controlling
and institutional ones. Again as reported above, this controversial policy was
expansively used, since both controlling and institutional shareholders took
advantage of this policy at the expense of both unsecured creditors and
general public shareholders.
This article ﬁnds that in 20 cases the general public shareholders did not
need to concede a single share if the absolute priority principle could have
applied to the controlling and institutional shareholders (see Appendix 2).
In these cases, if all of the controlling and institutional shares were surren-
dered, these shares would be enough to pay unsecured creditors at the
same level, without forcing general public shareholders to concede anything.
For example, in the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Ltd, the general public
shareholders were asked to give up 35 million shares to pay the unsecured
creditors, and the controlling and institutional shareholders relinquished 11
million shares but retained 98 million shares. It seems clear: if the 98 million
shares still possessed by the latter could be conceded according to the absol-
ute priority principle, as a result, the general public shareholders in this case
did not need to concede anything.
120C Wang, ‘ST Chuangzhi: 140 Million Still in the Hands of the Controlling Shareholder’ 21st Economy News
(27 January 2010) <http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20100127/02157314622.shtml> accessed 18
January 2015.
121X Liu, ‘ST Jiufa: Creditors in Danger’ China Commercial Review (11 May 2011) <http://ﬁnance.qq.com/a/
20110511/004883.htm> accessed 18 January 2015.
122See Q Liu and Z Lu, ‘Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies:
A Tunneling Perspective’ (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 881 (discussing the widespread tunnel-
ling in Chinese listed companies).
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By this method, with the current unsecured creditor recovery rate remain-
ing unchanged, this article concludes that, in these 32 cases where general
public shareholders were required to concede shares, 85.37% of these con-
ceded shares (relinquished shares) could be prevented if the Supreme
Court’s aforementioned policy intention could be fully implemented. Put it
in a different way, general public shareholders paid 85.37% more than they
were required. They were not winners either.
Why were general public shareholders disadvantaged? They encountered
similar situations faced by unsecured creditors, as analysed before. Even
worse, unlike unsecured creditors, general public shareholders have another
more acute problem: the collective action dilemma,123 since they are con-
siderably dispersed. It is quite difﬁcult to coordinate the vast number of
these individuals, as it is quite common for a Chinese listed company to
have over 40,000 general public shareholders.124 Coordinating these share-
holders is not easy. For example, in the case of Heilongjiang Beiya Ltd, only
the shareholders representing 426 million shares voted on the reorganisation
plan, and the remaining shareholders holding 538 million shares, the vast
majority of whom were general public shareholders, were absent from the
meeting, notwithstanding the online voting system was also available.125
In a nutshell, the unsecured creditors and general public shareholders were
not winners in China’s listed company reorganisations.
Section E: who were winners?
To a large extent, local governments and controlling shareholders were the
main beneﬁciaries of these reorganisations. Unlike controlling shareholders,
local governments beneﬁted from these cases in a subtle and indirect way.
1. Local governments as winners
Local governments were likely to be the main winners, since reorganising
these companies served both their political and economic interests.
This should be understood against the background of China’s political
economy. China has 32 provincial governments, 333 prefecture governments
and 2,861 county governments in the hierarchy.126 The most active local
123See C Xi, ‘Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice’ (2006) 17 International Company
and Commercial Law Review 251, 287.
124E.g. the reorganised company, Xiamen Xiaxin Electronic Ltd, had 54,192 shareholders, most of them
general public. See H An and B Ye, ‘Rehabilitation of Xiaxin through the Reorganization Procedure’
People’s Court Daily (30 August 2011) 3.
125Heilongjiang Beiya Ltd, ‘General Announcement on the Meeting of the Shareholders’ (Harbin Heilong-
jiang China, 22 April 2008).
126Xinhua News Agency, ‘Statistics of China’s Administrations above County Level’ Xinhua Net (31 Decem-
ber 2003) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/29/content_2154078.htm> accessed 19 January
2015.
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governments in these cases are at the prefecture level. With only
2,489 domestically listed companies in China, as noted before, this means
in theory each prefecture can only have fewer than eight listed
companies. But given the imbalanced economy of China, in fact some
prefectures have fewer. For example, by the end of 2013, the Shenzhen
prefecture in the well-developed Guangdong province had 260
listed companies,127 the Luoyan prefecture in the less-developed Henan pro-
vince had 10,128 and the Lu’an prefecture in another less-developed Anhui
province had only one.129 Thus, in practice, there is ﬁerce competition
between regions in China to ﬁght for more IPOs and for having more listed
companies.
First, on top of what the local government sought to gain was the political
image. Under China’s current political climate, the local government,
especially its senior political leaders, will lose face if a local company is
delisted. To save face, the local government will do whatever it can to main-
tain the listing of a local company.130 This may partially explain why the delist-
ing is a very rare phenomenon on China’s stock exchanges.131 Rescuing a local
listed company is a serious political mission. For example, when Guangming
Furniture Ltd was ready to enter reorganisation in 2010, an ofﬁcial in the
Yichun Prefecture Government explicitly told a newspaper: ‘since Guangming
is the only one listed company in Yichun, our major government leaders are
very serious to rescuing it and will ensure its success by whatever means.’132
This is also echoed by a recent research,133 which ﬁnds that local senior poli-
ticians are more likely to be promoted if there are more listed companies in
the region. In all these cases, for the local government, its political goal was
achieved, since all companies remained the listing status after going
through reorganisation.
Second, by rescuing these companies, the local governments were to
maintain their own tax bases. In China, taxes are charged and shared
127L Zhu, ‘The Number of Listed Companies from Shenzhen Reached 260’ Shenzhen Business Daily (16 Sep-
tember 2011) <http://www.szsmb.gov.cn/content.asp?id=53396> accessed 19 January 2015.
128The Financial Ofﬁce of the Luoyang Prefecture Government, ‘Latest Development of Local Companies
Seeking to Float’ <http://www.henanjr.gov.cn/portal/jrfw/zbsc/webinfo/2012/09/1348104660380154.
htm> accessed 19 January 2015.
129X Zhou, ‘Tongfeng Electronics Merged by Tieniu Group’ Anhui Business Daily (17 June 2007) <http://ah.
anhuinews.com/system/2007/06/17/001769151.shtml> accessed 19 January 2015.
130See S Li and Z Wang, ‘An Empirical Study on Implementing China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law during
the First Three Years’ (2011) 22 The Journal of China University of Political Science and Law 58 (noting
that a local listed company reﬂects the political image of the local government).
131See Y Wang and M Campbell, ‘Business Failure Prediction for Publicly Listed Companies’ (2010) 16
Journal of Business and Management 75, 79 (reporting that from 2000 to 2008 there were only 42 delist-
ings from the Shanghai Stock Exchange).
132Y Wang, ‘ST Guangming Ready for Reorganization and Visible Intervention of Yichun Government’ 21st
Century Business News (7 January 2010) <http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20100107/03077205091.
shtml> accessed 19 January 2015.
133JD Piotroski and T Zhang, ‘Politicians and the IPO Decision: The Impact of Impending Political Pro-
motions on IPO Activity in China’ (2014) 111 Journal of Financial Economics 111.
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between the central and local governments.134 The central government may
pay little attention on where a listed company is located, but local govern-
ments do. To this end, this is why the local government will rescue the
local listed company at any costs. This is also why in many cases the local gov-
ernment help the listed company to remain balance-sheet healthy through
generous subsidies. In all these 43 cases, it is found that only four companies
(Shenrun, Deheng, Danhua and Yuanfa) removed the registered headquarter
to where its main business operation took place. It means that the vast
majority of them (91%) stayed and continued to contribute taxes to the
local governments. As for these four dislocation cases, it remains unknown
what kind of deals have been reached between two local governments
behind closed doors.
By contrast to these four dislocation cases, there are 12 cases in which the
company’s main business operation was in fact removed to the different pro-
vince,135 which means that in principle their registered headquarters should
follow, but it was not the case. This further convinces this article’s assertion
that the local governments were winners, since these companies must pay
taxes to the authorities where their registered ofﬁces are.136
Third, in many cases, local governments were the controlling shareholders.
This may also explain why the local courts remained silent when the afore-
mentioned Supreme Court’s general-public-shareholder protection policy
was misused by the controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholder
was the local governments, thus keeping a blind eye seemed to be the best
strategy for the courts.
In addition, the local governments’ gains were also reﬂected at maintaining
social stability by using unsecured creditors’ money to bribe the general
public shareholders as well as the small unsecured creditors, as mentioned
before. And in the existing cases, inevitably, there were still some protests
occurring. For example, on 12 December 2011, some general public share-
holders of Yinchuan Guangxi Ltd travelled to Beijing and protested before
the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the protestors even
blocked the main gate of the Commission’s building.137 According to the
present political practice in China, it is the local government which is respon-
sible to bring, either by force or by persuasion, these protestors back to their
hometown. This involves costs. Such costs are usually passed to the company
ultimately. Though it seems impossible to unfold the size of these costs
134See K Tsui and Y Wang, ‘Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China’
(2004) 177 The China Quarterly 71.
135These companies are Chaohua, Hualong, Kejian, Beiya, Guangming, Xing’an, Tianfa, Tianyi, Lanbao,
Pianzhuan, Jiufa and Huayuan.
136Wang (n 132) (reporting that one of the local government’s aims in reorganisation is to make the com-
pany’s registered ofﬁce remained unchanged for tax purposes).
137M Li, ‘A Wave of General Public Shareholder Protests’ <http://t.hexun.com/wdqhgtq/12576158_d.
html> accessed 2 April 2015.
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in each case, this article does ﬁnd a staggering ﬁgure which may give a
glimpse.
According to its 2012 annual report,138 Sichuan Jinding Ltd had to pay the
local government RMB26,210,000 (approximately GBP2.621 million) for the
latter’s social stability expenditure during the company’s reorganisation
process; presumably, the local Leshan City government used this money to
cover all costs incurred from its social stability activities.
2. Controlling shareholders as winners
The controlling shareholders were the winners, mainly because they exploited
the Supreme Court’s policy by circumventing the absolute priority principle.
First, most of the controlling shareholders’ gains were exactly the losses of
unsecured creditors. In other words, the former sought to retain the bulk of
their equity at the expense of the latter. In principle, according to the absolute
priority principle, shareholders should be the ﬁrst line to bear the conse-
quences of the company’s bankruptcy; they are not allowed to receive any-
thing unless creditors, especially unsecured creditors, are fully paid. This
principle is also upheld by both China’s bankruptcy and company law, but
controlling shareholders backed by local governments misused the controver-
sial policy of the China Supreme People’s Court and transferred almost all
costs of reorganisations to unsecured creditors.
As has been calculated, the unsecured debt recovery rate could have been
increased from the present 25.14 to 86.51% if the absolute priority principle
could be faithfully complied with. Unsecured creditors’ losses were mainly
because what they were legally entitled had been grabbed by controlling
shareholders. Admittedly, all shareholders, including general public and con-
trolling shareholders, joined the feast, but controlling shareholders took the
lion’s share.
Second, on the side of shareholders, controlling shareholders also used
their positions to force general public shareholders to unnecessarily bear
the costs of reorganisations. As noted before, in many cases, the general
public shareholders did not need to concede a single share if the controlling
shareholders were subject to the absolute priority principle in the ﬁrst place;
as a result, the relinquished shares by general public shareholders in these
cases were their losses, which should be instead born by the controlling
shareholders.
It should be noted that the losses and gains are inter-conditional between
general public shareholders, controlling shareholders and unsecured credi-
tors. If a metaphor of a food chain could be used, at the top are the controlling
138Sichuan Jinding Ltd, 2012 Annual Report, 15 <http://www.cninfo.com.cn/ﬁnalpage/2013-01-29/
62078578.PDF> accessed 2 April 2015.
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shareholders, followed by the general public shareholders, with the unse-
cured creditors at the bottom.
Conclusions
This article has provided an in-depth investigation of how China’s listed com-
panies use the new corporate reorganisation law for restructuring and has
answered who are the winners and losers.
One point should be particularly addressed: enacting and implementing a
Chapter 11-style corporate reorganisation law in China has been proved to be
a step in the right direction, since an enormous amount of going-concern
value has been preserved, as reﬂected in the increased unsecured debt recov-
ery rate. This has been achieved mainly through using reorganisation to avoid
piecemeal liquidation. But concerns are raised especially on creditor
protection.
To better protect creditors, ﬁrst, to solve short-term problems, it seems
urgent for Chinese courts to stop appointing local-government-organised
liquidation committees as administrators in listed company reorganisations.
As investigated in this article, most of the local governments are the control-
ling shareholders, thereby it seems natural for them to place their own inter-
ests ahead of creditors. The current imbalance between debtor and creditor
could be alleviated by not making such appointments. And, as analysed
above, appointing these committees is also against the spirit of the EBL
2006. Ideally, the China Supreme People’s Court could issue a judicial notice
correcting the current practice. Meanwhile, creditors should be given a
strong voice on the administrator appointment, as the current situation of
creditors can largely be attributed to the little control of creditors in
Chinese listed company reorganisations.
Second, to solve the problems in the long run, China may strengthen its
rule of law. Many problems of creditor protection reported in this article are
in fact caused by the less-developed rule of law in China. Many creditor pro-
tection rules are clearly written in the EBL 2006, but in reality the public auth-
orities, including law courts, violate them without being held accountable.
This cannot be easy.139
Overall, China’s listed company reorganisations also reﬂect the widely-held
observation that China’s current commercial law reform is still ‘in a two-steps
forward, one step backward’ process.140
139See E Piles, China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance (Oxford, Routledge, 2014) 62.
140R Peerenboom, ‘Conclusion, Law, Wealth and Power in China’ in J Garrick (ed), Law, Wealth and Power in
China (Oxford, Routledge, 2011, 272, 273) .
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Assumed payment increase to the unsecured creditors: June 2007 to 31
December 2013.
Company Share Price Applied
Absolute-Priority-
Principle-Bound Increase
of the Unsecured Debt
Recovery Rate
Final Recovery Rate for
Unsecured Debts
Chaohua ¥2.72 a share (the average price
during the 60 days before being
suspended)
83.94% 93.94%
Xingmei ¥5.00 a share (the price set in its
reorganisation plan)
70% 100%
Xiaxing ¥3.71 a share (the price set in its
reorganisation plan)
34.19% 55.96%
Taibai ¥3.3 a share (priced according to
a share deal in the
reorganisation plan)
58.31% 100%
Zhonghua ¥2.875 a share (generated from
averaging the A and B shares
priced in the plan)
69.33% 100%
Chuangzhi ¥4.68 a share (the price set in
the reorganisation plan)
84.42% 100%
Hualong ¥3.65 a share (the price referred
in a recent share deal)
Missing Missing
Kejian ¥11.25 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
47.03% 82.28%
Taifeng ¥8.64 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
79.67% 100%
Shenrun ¥8.535 a share (generated by
averaging the A and B shares
priced in its reorganisation plan)
69.95% 100%
Xingtai ¥6.9 a share (the price generated
from an auction, later the market
price was speculated to ¥15.58 a
share)
78.23% 100%
Beishen ¥3.00 a share (set in its
reorganisation plan)
49.56% 100%
Baoshuo ¥6.00 a share (priced in its 2008
reorganisation plan)
31.46% 44.46%
Chuanghua ¥5 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
38.15% 49.59%
Dixian ¥2.1 a share (the market price
shortly after the reorganisation)
98% 100%
Beiya ¥3.5 a share (the average price
during the three months before
being suspended)
81% 100%
Guangming ¥12.52 a share (generated from
a share transaction during the
reorganisation)
82% 100%
Xin’an ¥2.92 a publicly circular share,
and ¥1.28 a non-circular share
36.78% 53.83%
Tianfa ¥4.445 a share (the average
price during the twenty days
before being suspended)
82.27% 100%
(Continued )
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Appendix 1. Continued.
Company Share Price Applied
Absolute-Priority-
Principle-Bound Increase
of the Unsecured Debt
Recovery Rate
Final Recovery Rate for
Unsecured Debts
Tianyi ¥4.33 (the average price during
the twenty days before being
suspended)
70.82% 80.89%
Deheng ¥5.28 a share (the price of the
shares sold to the strategic
investor)
58.15% 100%
Lanbao ¥0.88 a share (the average price
during the twenty days before
being suspended)
12.27% 34.27%
Shijian ¥3.03 a share (the concluding
price on the day of opening the
reorganisation procedure)
83.24% 93.24%
Danhua ¥3.64 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
78.7% 100%
Jingchen ¥6.16 a share (the closing price
on the day of being suspended)
95% 100%
Jinhua ¥3.9 a share (the starting price
set in a subsequent auction by
the company)
95% 100%
Guangxia ¥7 a share (the closing price on
the day of being suspended)
50% 100%
Changling ¥6.34 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
82% 100%
Pianzhuan N/A (already fully paid) N/A N/A
Qingling ¥5.78 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
50% 100%
Jiufa ¥2.15 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
15.08% 35.56%
Hailong ¥2.93 a share (the closing price
on the day of entering
reorganisation)
36.12% 76.12%
Hongshen ¥4.32 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
88% 100%
Huayuan ¥4.37 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
69.49% 83.91%
Yuanfa ¥6.92 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan, and also the
average price during the twenty
days before being suspended)
24.06% 100%
Fangxiang ¥3.82 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan, also the
closing price on the day of being
suspended)
55.49% 75.17%
Jingding ¥3.8 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
82% 100%
Haina ¥7.2 a share (the closing price on
the day of being suspended by
the stock exchange)
74.65% 100%
Changhang ¥2.53 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan, also the
closing price on the day of being
suspended by the stock
exchange)
37.32% 48.96%
(Continued )
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 141
Appendix 1. Continued.
Company Share Price Applied
Absolute-Priority-
Principle-Bound Increase
of the Unsecured Debt
Recovery Rate
Final Recovery Rate for
Unsecured Debts
Zhongda ¥2.1 a share (priced in its
reorganisation plan)
70.4% 100%
Xingye ¥2.41 a share (the closing price
on the day of opening the
reorganisation)
44.13% 49.13%
Xianchen ¥8.00 a share (the price of the
shares sold to an investor by the
administrator later)
97% 100%
Zhongji (中
基实业)
¥2.5 a share (evaluated by an
ofﬁcial evaluating ﬁrm)
35.58% 89.44%
Average 62.90% 86.51% (in 25 out of 41
(61%) cases, unsecured
creditors could have been
fully paid)
Appendix 2. Assumed advantages to the general public shareholders: June 2007 to 31
December 2013
Company
Shares Conceded by
the General Public
Shareholders (shares)
The Remaining Shares
Possessed by the
Controlling and Non-Circular
Shareholders (shares)
The Remaining Shares Possessed
by Controlling and Non-Circular
Shareholders out of the Shares
Conceded by General Public
Shareholders (%) (the
preventable loss of the general
public shareholders)
Chaohua N/A N/A N/A
Xingmei N/A N/A N/A
Xiaxing 24,463,037 139,672,203 More than 100%
Taibai N/A N/A N/A
Zhonghua 35,370,070 98,299,817 More than 100%
Chuangzhi 57,994,320 39,611,130 68.30%
Hualong N/A N/A N/A
Kejian 26,784,163 38,768,400 More than 100%
Taifeng 18,849,303 144,021,257 More than 100%
Shenrun 10,945,500 39,685,143 More than 100%
Xingtai 4,867,215 115,624,761 More than 100%
Beishen 71,588,733 64,324,528 89.85%
Baoshuo 40,295,784 83,996,769 More than 100%
Chuanghua 6,813,915 210,998,483 More than 100%
Dixian N/A N/A N/A
Beiya N/A N/A N/A
Guangming 2,008,600 89,318,325 More than 100%
Xin’an 7,375,679 26,442,772 More than 100%
Tianfa N/A N/A N/A
Tianyi N/A N/A N/A
Deheng 29,426,283 11,122,180 37.80%
Lanbao N/A N/A N/A
Shijian 60,386,904 70,002,146 More than 100%
Danhua 50,700,000 86,529,867 More than 100%
Jingchen 54,891,780 27,755,280 50.56%
(Continued )
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Appendix 2. Continued.
Company
Shares Conceded by
the General Public
Shareholders (shares)
The Remaining Shares
Possessed by the
Controlling and Non-Circular
Shareholders (shares)
The Remaining Shares Possessed
by Controlling and Non-Circular
Shareholders out of the Shares
Conceded by General Public
Shareholders (%) (the
preventable loss of the general
public shareholders)
Jinhua 89,923,200 266,179,200 More than 100%
Guangxia 82,968,977 7,483,400 9.02%
Changling 24,206,332 41,754,520 More than 100%
Pianzhuan N/A N/A N/A
Qingling 104,345,643 93,427,425 89.54%
Jiufa 43,245,467 31,837,607 73.62%
Hailong 126,403,439 176,684,732 More than 100%
Hongshen 23,790,543 33,589,968 More than 100%
Huayuan 85,410,900 15,105,870 17.69%
Yuanfa 97,627,600 151,510,400 More than 100%
Fangxiang 43,980,444 113,109,955 More than 100%
Jingding 64,219,577 53,717,587 83.65%
Haina N/A N/A N/A
Changhang 247,218,252 180,285,800 72.93%
Zhongda 153,989,758 227,466,836 More than 100%
Xingye 274,010,858 332,607,048 More than 100%
Xianchen 22,414,589 10,683,725 47.66%
Zhongji 186,813,818 170,695,084 91.37% (continued)
Average Except the eleven
reorganisations where all
previous shares remained intact,
the general public shareholders
had, on average, 85.37%
preventable losses in the
remaining thirty-two cases if the
policy of the China Supreme
People’s Court could be
adequately implemented. In
particular, in twenty out of these
thirty-two cases (62.5%), the
losses of the general public
shareholders could have been
one hundred per cent avoided.
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